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A central assumption of modern evidence law is that its rules are rules of
admissibility only. That is, they tell judges whether or not a given piece of
evidence may be viewed by the factfinder, but they do not purport to tell the
finder of fact how to evaluate the evidence once admitted. One can imagine,
however, a system of rules that helps factfinders weigh evidence by instructing
them, for instance, that the law considers a class of evidence (say, hearsay) to be
of "low weight." In fact, such rules-rules of weight-are an old idea with
roots in Roman law. But they have long been ignored by evidence scholars or,
when considered, judged to be anachronistic and deeply inconsistent with a
system of trial by jury.
This Article argues that such hostility to rules of weight is unjustified and
that their use should be taken seriously as a possible direction for evidence
reform. Given that jury trials are now increasingly rare and that, when a jury
is used, its discretion is already constrained in a number of ways, the orthodox
view of rules of weight now itself seems outdated. Furthermore, there are rea-
sons to think that such rules could be beneficial for forensic factfinding. The
past use of them by courts, their current role in administrative adjudication,
and recent research in cognitive psychology all suggest ways in which rules of
weight could make factfinding fairer, more efficient, and, most important, more
accurate. Such benefits make the Supreme Court's recent condemnation of the
use of rules of weight in the administrative context that much more difficult to
justify.
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INTRODUCTION
Modern evidence law tends to be an all-or-nothing affair. Most
rules of evidence are admissibility rules that tell judges simply whether
or not a given piece of evidence may be viewed by the factfinder.
They do not purport to tell the finder of fact how to evaluate the
evidence once admitted. One thus frequently hears trial courts
respond to evidentiary objections by saying that a given issue "goes to
weight, not admissibility." The point made is that determining admis-
sibility presents a question of law for the judge while evaluating the
evidence is a task for the jury to conduct solely in its discretion.
But one can imagine a factfinding process structured quite differ-
ently. Rather than providing merely for rules of exclusion, one could
design a system of rules that guides the factfinder's evaluation of the
evidence by specifying the probative value the factfinder ought to
attach to a given piece of evidence. Thus, for instance, one might
admit all hearsay evidence as an inferior grade of evidence to which the
factfinder is instructed to accord little weight. Or one could have a
rule that treats eyewitness identifications made under certain condi-
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tions as requiring corroboration in order to sustain a conviction. In
short, one could imagine a factfinding process governed by rules of
weight instead of, or in addition to, rules of exclusion.
Indeed, when dealing with questions of law, courts do something
quite like this. The idea of assigning weights to different classes of
evidence, for example, is familiar in the context of statutory interpre-
tation. Although some deny the legitimacy of using the legislative his-
tory of a statute to interpret its meaning,' those who do draw on it
generally consider it to be relevant evidence of legislative intent but a
categorically less reliable indicator of it than the statute's text.2 One
function of rules of weight is to structure a comparable hierarchy of
evidentiary sources.
Rules of weight are hardly a new idea. The most famous exam-
ples of them come from Roman law, where the testimony of at least
two witnesses was required for the conviction of certain crimes.3 And
the first treatise on the common law of evidence, published in 1754,
ranked categories of evidence according to their probative value. 4 But
there has been virtually no serious discussion of them for almost a
century. The last effort to offer a sustained treatment of rules of
weight was a little-known 1908 treatise written by a lawyer named
Charles Moore.5 In A Treatise on Facts or the Weight and Value of Evi-
dence, Moore compiled thousands of cases that he argued could be,
and often had already been, cited as legal authority on such factual
issues as whether experiencing pain or sudden shock enhances or dis-
torts one's memory of events or whether a witness who has previously
given contradictory testimony is to be believed. 6
The century's leading evidence scholar, John Henry Wigmore,
immediately condemned Moore's treatise as "moral treason" for its
suggestion that the jury's discretion to determine the weight and cred-
ibility of the evidence could be in any way constrained by rules of law. 7
1 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION 3, 3-48 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997);John F. Manning, Textualism as a
Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 673, 686 (1997).
2 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as
Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 353-56 (1990).
3 John Henry Wigmore, Required Numbers of Witnesses; A Brief History of the Numeri-
cal System in England, 15 HARv. L. REV. 83, 84 (1901).
4 GEOFFREY GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 4-5 (photo. reprint 1979) (1754).
5 CHARLES C. MOORE, A TREATISE ON FAcTS OR THE WEIGHT AND VALUE OF Evi-
DENCE (1908).
6 See 1 id. at v-viii; 2 id. § 740, at 809-10; id. § 1079, at 1217.
7 John H. Wigmore, Book Review, 3 ILL. L. REV. 477, 477-78 (1909) (reviewing
MOORE, supra note 5).
20o8] 1959
196o NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW [VOL. 83:5
And Wigmore's view has become conventional wisdom.8  Since
Moore's time, rules of weight have been for the most part ignored
entirely or, when considered, dismissed as anachronistic or at odds
with a system of trial by jury.9
But such malign neglect of rules of weight seems unjustified. For
one thing, the claim that rules of weight illegitimately usurp the jury's
role is difficult to reconcile with the fact that courts already employ
several relatively uncontroversial evidentiary doctrines, including
admissibility rules, presumptions, and sufficiency rules, that constrain
and channel the jury's discretion in one way or another.10
Furthermore, even if rules of weight were deeply inconsistent
with trial by jury, their wholesale dismissal would still not be war-
ranted. As leading evidence scholars have long maintained, jury trials
should no longer serve as the exclusive paradigm of forensic factfind-
ing because they account for only a small fraction of overall civil and
criminal dispositions.11 Even more adjudication takes place in admin-
8 WILLIAM TWINING, RETHINKING EVIDENCE 71 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed.
2006) (1990) ("Wigmore's view has generally prevailed. Moore seems to have made
little impact and was soon forgotten.").
9 See, e.g., id. at 70 (suggesting that Moore made a "category mistake" in thinking
that courts could offer authoritative guidance on factual issues and that Moore's "con-
ception of the enterprise was rather confused");Jennifer Mnookin, Bifurcation and the
Law of Evidence, 155 U. PA. L. REV. PENNuMBRA 134, 142 (2006), http://www.pen-
numbra.com/responses/12-2006/Mnookin.pdf (noting that rules of weight seem
"deeply at odds with the very institution out of which evidence rules partly emerged:
the jury as fact-finder"). There are a few exceptions to this generalization. See, e.g.,
MiRJAN DAMAKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFr 19 (1997) (defending the Roman system of
proof against criticisms that its use of rules of weight was excessively "mechanical");
ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW 242 (2005) (endorsing the use of corrob-
oration rules, one common type of rule of weight).
10 DAMASKA, supra note 9, at 19 (noting that despite the aspirations to a system of
"free proof," Anglo-American evidence law regulates and structures the factfinding
process in a number of ways). Corroboration rules, however, remain controversial.
See, e.g., Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 574-75 (2000) (GinsburgJ., dissenting) (criti-
cizing a Texas corroboration requirement on the ground that "'[o]ur system of jus-
tice rests on the general assumption that the truth is not to be determined merely by
the number of witnesses on each side of a controversy. In gauging the truth of con-
flicting evidence, ajury has no simple formulation of weights and measures on which
to rely. The touchstone is always credibility; the ultimate measure of testimonial
worth is quality and not quantity"' (quoting Weiler v. United States, 323 U.S. 606, 608
(1945))). Despite the critical language, the Weiler Court upheld the corroboration
rule in perjury cases. See Weiler, 323 U.S. at 609-11.
11 See DAMASKA, supra note 9, at 128-29 (noting that "jury trials continue to be
employed both as the institutional background for reflection on evidence and as a
benchmark for shaping evidentiary rules," but that "this fixation on classical court
organization-an increasing anachronism in contemporary conditions-cannot last
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istrative agencies, where rules of weight are quite common. Regula-
tions promulgated by the Social Security Administration, for instance,
demand that more weight be accorded to the testimony of the treat-
ing physician than to that of other experts in adjudicating benefits
claims. 12 Agency practice, then, may offer a clue as to how factfinding
can be regulated in a system of nonbifurcated decisionmaking.13
Given that more and more adjudication is nonbifurcated in this way, it
seems worthwhile to reconsider rules of weight and to investigate their
relative merits.
This Article is an effort to do just that. Its purpose is both to
clarify what rules of weight are and to argue that they should be taken
seriously as a possible direction for evidence reform. It does not claim
that rules of weight are appropriate in all contexts and for all pur-
poses; nor does it call for the adoption of any particular rule. But it
does argue that the conventional view, according to which evidence
law consists exclusively of rules of admissibility, is an overly cramped
one, because rules of weight have the potential to make factfinding
more fair, more efficient and-most important-more accurate.
Recent work by cognitive psychologists, for instance, suggests that
people, even when well trained in the relevant field, are typically poor
at assigning weight to evidence when making diagnostic and predic-
tive judgments.1 4 And although many scholars have discussed various
ways in which the "heuristics and biases" research program may apply
to forensic factfinding, none has proposed rules of weight as a possi-
much longer"); TWINING, supra note 8, at 169 ("There is a tendency in the orthodox
literature on evidence to treat the contested jury trial as the paradigm case of all trials.
This is understandable, though misleading .... "); Roger C. Park & Michael J. Saks,
Evidence Scholarship Reconsidered: Results of the Interdisciplinary Turn, 47 B.C. L. REv. 949,
956 (2006) (explaining the relative decline of doctrinal evidence scholarship as a con-
sequence of the decreasing significance of the jury trial and noting that the structural
changes identified by Professor Damagka "might make the current rules obsolete").
Several articles present statistics and analysis relating to the decline in jury trials. See
generally Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Mat-
ters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 460-77 (2004) (report-
ing on the precipitous decline in the occurrence of trials in American civil litigation);
Kent D. Syverud, ADR and the Decline of the American CivilJury, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1935,
1942-43 (1997) (arguing that defects in the civil jury system and the growth of alter-
native dispute resolution methods are central causes of the collapse of the American
jury system).
12 See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d) (2) (2007).
13 The suggestion that we ought to look to administrative adjudication as a source
of guidance for evidence reform is hardly novel. See, e.g., Kenneth Culp Davis, Evi-
dence Reform: The Administrative Process Leads the Way, 34 MINN. L. REv. 581 (1950).
14 See infra Part II.C.1.
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ble remedy for the cognitive defects identified.15 Again, this neglect is
15 For the most part, evidence scholars have considered the biases and heuristics
research program to be relevant to evidence law and perhaps a justification for partic-
ular reform efforts. See, e.g., Erica Beecher-Monas, Heuristics, Biases, and the Importance
of Gatekeeping, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REv. 987, 1003 (arguing that the possibility thatjurors
will suffer from the "dilution effect" in part justifies the judge's gatekeeper role in
admitting expert testimony); VictorJ. Gold, Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Observations on
the Nature of Unfairly Prejudicial Evidence, 58 WASH. L. REV. 497, 511-24 (1983) (sug-
gesting that the heuristics and biases research is relevant to evidence law); Kevin Jon
Heller, The Cognitive Psychology of Circumstantial Evidence, 105 MICH. L. REv. 241,
244-45 (2006) (arguing that the heuristics research may explain why jurors systemati-
cally overvalue the probative value of direct evidence in comparison to circumstantial
evidence);JonathanJ. Koehler & Daniel N. Shaviro, Veridical Verdicts: Increasing Verdict
Accuracy Through the Use of Overtly Probabilistic Evidence and Methods, 75 CORNELL L. REV.
247, 272-77 (1990) (arguing that heuristics and biases research shows that people
ignore base rates); Thomas D. Lyon &Jonathan J. Koehler, The Relevance Ratio: Evalu-
ating the Probative Value of Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuses, 82 CORNELL L. REV.
43, 65 n.81 (1996) (noting that such research suggests that people may misestimate
the probative value of evidence that a victim suffered from a cluster of symptoms
relevant to child sexual abuse);Joeflle Anne Moreno, Translating "Visions of Rationality"
into Specific Legal Reforms, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1175, 1177-81 (discussing the rele-
vance of such research to the ways jurors make decisions);JJ. Prescott & Sonja Starr,
Improving Criminal Jury Decision Making After the Blakely Revolution, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV.
301, 333-45 (discussing a variety of cognitive errors that may affect factfinding by
jurors in sentencing proceedings); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the
Courts: Ignorance or Adaptation , 79 OR. L. REv. 61, 93 (2000) (suggesting that the hind-
sight bias and "representativeness heuristic" affect legal decisionmaking but that
judges are more aware of such errors in juries than in themselves); D. Michael Risin-
ger & Michael J. Saks, Rationality, Research and Leviathan: Law Enforcement-Sponsored
Research and the Criminal Process, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1023, 1036-50 (discussing
heuristics research and its bearing on conceptions of rationality relevant to evidence
law); Daniel Shaviro, Statistical-Probability Evidence and the Appearance of Justice, 103
HARv. L. REv. 530, 542-43 (1989) (arguing that aversions to the use of naked statisti-
cal evidence may be best explained as a "moral heuristic" that reduces complexity and
cognitive dissonance); AndrewJ. Wistrich et al., Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Informa-
tion? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1291 (2005)
(conducting a study that confirmed thatjudges may suffer from "anchoring effects" in
assessing the appropriate amount of damages to award). However, some scholars
have remained skeptical about either the intrinsic validity of the research or its useful-
ness for understanding or reforming evidence law. See, e.g., L. Jonathan Cohen, Can
Human Irrationality Be Experimentally Demonstrated?, 4 BEHAV. & BRAIN ScL 317, 317-18,
326-30 (1981) (arguing that cognitive psychologists, particularly Kahneman and
Tversky, may be guilty of misinterpreting their own data, and expressing doubt at the
very idea of demonstrating that humans are systematically incompetent reasoners);
Gregory Mitchell, Mapping Evidence Law, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REv. 1065, 1082 (arguing
that the heuristics and biases research is not as broadly applicable as some have
thought and suggesting instead that an approach more sensitive to context is war-
ranted); Chris William Sanchirico, Character Evidence and the Object of Trial, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 1227, 1242 (2001) (rejecting the argument that the representative-
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somewhat surprising, because using rules that attempt to grade the
probative value of evidence seems like an obvious solution. 16
The structure of this Article is straightforward. Part I presents
and responds to the primary objection to rules of weight, namely that
they are deeply incompatible with a system of trial byjury. I show that,
rhetoric aside, the jury's discretion is in fact cabined in a number of
ways and that, in any case, jury trials constitute only a small portion of
adjudications. 17 Part II then lays out the case for rules of weight. It
begins by clarifying what exactly rules of weight are and how they dif-
fer from other evidentiary devices. It then argues that using such
rules has the potential to increase the efficiency, fairness, and accu-
racy of adjudicative factfinding. Part III considers a far deeper chal-
lenge to rules of weight. It analyzes the Supreme Court's discussion of
rules of weight in the case of Allentown Mack Sales & Service, Inc. v.
NLRB,' 8 in which the Court appears to have concluded that such rules
violate fundamental principles of due process.19 I argue that even
under sympathetic interpretations, the Court's reasoning fails to jus-
tify a blanket exclusion of all rules of weight in all adjudicatory con-
texts. Finally, in conclusion, I suggest that my analysis of rules of
weight shows how drawing comparisons between methods of finding
facts and interpreting law may illuminate both practices.
ness heuristic justifies the exclusion of character evidence); Peter Tillers, Wat Is
Wrong with Character Evidence?, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 781, 791 (1998) (criticizing the sug-
gestion that the heuristics line of research implies that "all people-or practically all
people, in any event-are incapable ofjudging the true value of character evidence");
Charles Yablon, The Meaning of Probability Judgments: An Essay on the Use and Misuse of
Behavioral Economics, 2004 U. ILL. L. REv. 899, 927-29 (criticizing the suggestion that
the base rate problems studied by Kahneman and Tversky necessarily imply human
irrationality). Finally, at least one scholar has suggested a way in which the cognitive
errors identified by psychologists may be valuable for evidentiary purposes. See Chris
William Sanchirico, Evidence, Procedure, and the Upside of Cognitive Error, 57 STAN. L.
REV. 291, 298 (2004) (suggesting that certain cognitive errors may be instrumentally
valuable insofar as they make it more difficult for witnesses to lie).
16 See Mnookin, supra note 9, at 142 (noting, in response to Professor Schauer's
argument that the cognitive defects from which judges likely suffer may justify the
application of admissibility rules even in bench trials, that "rules of assessment" are
likely better suited to the task).
17 In so doing, I draw in part from Professor Damagka's analysis. See DAMASKA,
supra note 9, at 17-20.
18 522 U.S, 359 (1998).
19 See id. at 380.
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I. RULES OF WEIGHT AND THE JURY SYSTEM
A. The Early History of Rules of Weight
Rules of weight have their roots in medieval Roman law. Under
Roman law, and later under Continental civil law, the testimony of
one witness was typically insufficient to prove most crimes. 20 The
number of witnesses required to prove various acts varied, but for
many crimes, such as murder, the testimony of at least two witnesses
was required for the "full proof' necessary to sustain a conviction. 21
One witness' testimony, however, was sufficient to establish "half
proof," which authorized the court to have the defendant tortured
until he confessed to the crime.22 The seemingly naive epistemologi-
cal assumption on which this system appeared to rest, namely that any
testimony given under oath was as probative as any other, not to men-
tion its close institutional affiliation with a system of torture, makes
the Roman system of proof easy to caricature as draconian. But the
purpose of such rules was, at least in theory, the humane one of offer-
ing criminal defendants some protection against the otherwise
unchecked power of judges.2 3 The judge, for instance, was rarely
required to make positive findings against a defendant because of the
number of witnesses. 24
The common law for the most part has not been receptive to
such "corroboration rules," which appear to be in some tension with a
system in which the jury assesses the credibility of the evidence. But
there are some notable exceptions. The United States Constitution,
for instance, requires the testimony of two witnesses for a treason con-
viction. 25 And federal courts and many states require two witnesses to
sustain a perjury conviction. 26 Corroborative evidence has also been
20 Wigmore, supra note 3, at 84.
21 See Barbara J. Shapiro, "Fact" and the Proof of Fact in Anglo-American Law (c.
1500-1850), in How LAW KNOWS 28, 31 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2007) (discussing the
development of medieval practices from many influences, including Roman law).
22 Id.
23 WILLIAM WILLS, AN ESSAY ON THE RATIONALE OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
34-35 (London, Longman et al. 1838); see alsoJohn H. Langbein, Torture and Plea
Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 4 (1978) ("In the history of Western culture no legal
system has ever made a more valiant effort to perfect its safeguards and thereby to
exclude completely the possibility of a mistaken conviction.").
24 DAMASKA, supra note 9, at 19-20.
25 U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 3 ("No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on
the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open
Court.").
26 See Weiler v. United States, 323 U.S. 606, 609-11 (1945) (upholding the two-
witness rule for perjury); Hammer v. United States, 271 U.S. 620, 626 (1926) ("The
1964 [VOL. 83:5
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required to sustain convictions based on the testimony of the victims
of sexual abuse or the testimony of an accomplice to a crime.27 Fur-
thermore, the first treatise writer on the common law of evidence
endorsed the use of such rules.
Lord Chief Baron Gilbert's The Law of Evidence28 is considered the
first treatise on evidence law.29 Gilbert is now best known both for
establishing evidence as an independent branch of law and for basing
it on the "best evidence principle," according to which the central
function of evidence law is to secure the best available evidence.3 0 Gil-
bert opened his treatise by declaring that "It]he first Thing to be
treated of, is the Evidence that ought to be offer[e]d to the Jury, and
by what Rules of Probability it ought to be weigh[e]d and con-
sider[e]d.' 1 The burden of evidence law was thus to ensure that the
evidence adduced by parties in a legal dispute was accorded precisely
the amount of weight that its degree of probability required, thereby
general rule in prosecutions for perjury is that the uncorroborated oath of one wit-
ness is not enough to establish the falsity of the testimony of the accused set forth in
the indictment as perjury. The application of that rule in federal and state courts is
well nigh universal. The rule has long prevailed, and no enactment in derogation of
it has come to our attention." (footnote omitted)). Some states have abandoned the
two-witness rule for perjury convictions. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Silva, 516 N.E.2d
161, 165 (Mass. 1987) ("Hereafter, the Commonwealth may secure a conviction of
perjury where it is able to offer evidence of perjury and corroboration of that evi-
dence sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."). But
other states continue to require corroboration of a single witness' testimony. See, e.g.,
CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-8-506 (West 2004) ("In any prosecution for perjury or
false swearing, except a prosecution based upon inconsistent statements. .. ,falsity of
a statement may not be established solely through contradiction by the uncorrobo-
rated testimony of a single witness."); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 210.50 (McKinney 1998) ("In
any prosecution for perjury, except a prosecution based upon inconsistent statements
pursuant to section 210.20, or in any prosecution for making an apparently sworn
false statement, or making a punishable false written statement, falsity of a statement
may not be established by the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness.").
27 See LAW COMM'N, LAW COM. No. 202, CRIMINAL LAW: CORROBORATION OF Evi-
DENCE IN CRIMINAL TRiAts 3-7 (1991) [hereinafter CORROBORATION OF EVIDENCE]
(recommending the abolition of England's accomplice testimony corroboration
rule); Irving Younger, The Requirement of Corroboration in Prosecutions for Sex Offenses in
New York, 40 FORDHAM L. REv. 263, 264-66 (1971) (surveying states with corrobora-
tion rules for sexual offenses).
28 GILBERT, supra note 4.
29 TWINING, supra note 8, at 38-39; BarbaraJ. Shapiro, "To a Moral Certainty":
Theories of Knowledge and Anglo-American Juries 1600-1850, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 153, 176
(1986).
30 GILBERT, supra note 4, at 1-2. For the leading modern-day proponent of the
best evidence principle, see Dale A. Nance, The Best Evidence Principle, 73 IowA L. REv.
227 (1988).
31 GILBERT, supra note 4, at 1.
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enabling the factfinder to make the "most exact Di[sc]ernment" of
the rights at issue.32
To this end, Gilbert established an elaborate hierarchy in which
he classified types of evidence according to their relative weight. Writ-
ten evidence was considered superior to unwritten evidence, 33 and
within the category of written evidence, sealed documents were supe-
rior to unsealed documents and publicly sealed documents superior
to privately sealed ones.3 4 Similarly, when witnesses testified, two wit-
nesses testifying under oath constituted evidence of a higher "degree
of credibility" than merely one witness and "[o] ne affirmative Witness
countervails the Proof of several Negative. '3 5 This latter rule was justi-
fied on the ground that those testifying in the negative may "know not
of the Matter," in which case the two testimonies do not contradict
each other. 36 But Gilbert's attempt to subject factfinding to such an
elaborate set of rules provoked a bitter attack by Jeremy Bentham.
B. Bentham, Thayer, and "Free Proof'
In his massive, five-volume Rationale of Judicial Evidence and in
other shorter works, Jeremy Bentham expounded a view of evidence
that has been called "the most ambitious and fully developed theory
of evidence and proof in the history of legal thought. '3 7 Bentham's
primary target was Gilbert, and his goal was to show why all rules of
evidence should be abolished.
Bentham denied Gilbert's premise that evidence law was
designed to ensure the production of the best evidence available. 38
Instead, for Bentham, the direct end of evidence law-and indeed all
procedural law-was rather to secure "rectitude of decision," so that
legal obligations would only be imposed upon those "on whom the
legislator intended that they should be conferred and imposed. '39
This principle was to be limited only by the second, "collateral" goal of
avoiding "unnecessary delay, vexation, and expense. '40 In Bentham's
view, virtually all rules of evidence only frustrated attempts to achieve
these goals. "To find infallible rules for evidence, rules which insure a
32 Id. at 1-2.
33 See id. at 4-5.
34 See id. at 15-16.
35 Id. at 108-10.
36 Id. at 110.
37 TWINING, supra note 8, at 42.
38 See WILLIAM TWINING, THEORIES OF EVIDENCE 32 (1985).





just decision," Bentham insisted, "is, from the nature of things, abso-
lutely impossible; but the human mind is too apt to establish rules
which only increase the probabilities of a bad decision. '41 He advo-
cated instead a "natural system" of evidence in which judges found
facts entirely unencumbered by rules. Doing so would facilitate the
only "mode of searching out the truth," namely "see everything that is
to be seen; hear every body who is likely to know any thing about the
matter."42 Thus, Bentham's system of "free proof' had little room for
rules of weight or rules of admissibility. 43
Bentham did not deny that factfinders may need help in evaluat-
ing evidence. Indeed, in place of exclusionary rules, he advocated a
"system of instruction," which would serve as a "gentle and rational
substitute" for a system of exclusion. 44 Under this system, "the judge
has before him the instruction, which, in its nature, cannot be so
much as intended to serve as a guide to the understanding of ajudge,
without also serving as a check upon his will."'45 Bentham discussed at
length the form and substance such instructions might take. He cata-
logued, for instance, the various types of interests-wealth, power,
reputation, sympathy, disgrace-that tend to affect the reliability of
witness testimony.46
Still, Bentham established "free proof' as the new baseline for
evaluating evidence law. The idea that any rule of evidence requires
affirmative justification has endured in Anglo-American evidence
scholarship, and the doctrinal trend has been toward fewer and nar-
rower exclusionary rules.47 Thus, Bentham's "anti-nomian thesis" has
been partially vindicated: the modern approach looks askance at rules
of weight, but continues to apply admissibility rules.48
This view finds the clearest expression in the work and teachings
of James Bradley Thayer, who was, along with his student Wignore,
one of the founders of modern evidence law.49 Thayer exerted tre-
mendous influence on later scholars, partly through teaching and
41 JEREMY BENTHAM, A TREATISE ON JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 180 (Fred B. Rotham & Co.
1981) (1825).
42 5 BENTHAM, supra note 39, at 743.
43 Id. Bentham himself never used the phrase "free proof," but the term has
come to be associated with his antinomian approach. See TWINING, supra note 8, at
209.
44 5 BENTHAM, supra note 39, at 615.
45 Id. at 616.
46 See id. at 629.
47 See STEIN, supra note 9, at 108; TWINING, supra note 38, at 69.
48 TWINING, supra note 8, at 44 ("In respect of rules of weight, Bentham's views
have largely prevailed").
49 See id. at 61-62.
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partly through his mostly historical Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at
Common Law. 5
0
For Thayer, the purpose of evidence law could be stated simply.
The "main errand of the law of evidence," he explained, was "to deter-
mine not so much what is admissible in proof, as what is inadmissi-
ble."5 ' Whether evidence ought to be excluded was determined by
two factors. First, by relevance, which was "an affair of logic and expe-
rience," and second, "by the law of evidence, which declares whether
any given matter which is logically probative is excluded. ' 52 Evidence
law in turn required "(1) that nothing is to be received which is not
logically probative of some matter requiring to be proved; and (2)
that everything which is thus probative should come in, unless a clear
ground of policy or law excludes it."5 3 In other words, in contrast to
"old formal and mechanical systems," evidence law consisted merely
in a narrow set of admissibility rules, which served as grounds for
excluding otherwise relevant evidence. 54
Thayer's view has become orthodoxy. Under the modern view,
evidence law includes only exclusionary rules designed to determine
which evidence the factfinder may consider, but it does not purport to
guide the factfinding process. According to Thayer, it "does not
undertake to regulate the processes of reasoning or argument, except
as helping to discriminate and select the material of fact upon which
these are to operate."55 To do otherwise would be to ask the impossi-
ble: "[t] he law has no mandamus to the logical faculty; it orders no
body to draw inferences." 56 "For reasoning," Thayer insisted, "there is
no law other than the laws of thought. '5 7
C. Moore and His Critics
The orthodox view, however, is not the only way to treat ques-
tions of fact. And in Thayer's own time, one treatise writer offered a
different approach. In 1908, a writer and lawyer named Charles
Moore compiled thousands of cases in his work, A Treatise on Facts or
the Weight and Value of Evidence.58 According to Moore, the cases col-
50 JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON
LAW (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1898).
51 Id. at 268.
52 Id. at 269.
53 Id. at 530.
54 See id. at 265.
55 Id. at 263.
56 Id. at 313 n.1.
57 Id. at 314.
58 MoORE, supra note 5.
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lected contained rules for weighing evidence and assessing the credi-
bility of witnesses. Moore made plain this ambition in his very first
sentences:
Arguments on any question of fact can be supported by refer-
ence to judicial authorities-on both sides-as fully as arguments
on questions of law are thus fortified. The design of this work is to
facilitate the preparation for trial, the argument, and the decision
of questions of fact, by exhibiting what has been said by United
States, Canadian, and English judges concerning the causes of trust-
worthiness and untrustworthiness of evidence, and the rules for
determining its probative weight.59
In these cases, Moore explained, the reader could find the "deliberate
convictions of unprejudiced minds, enlightened in numerous
instances by vast experience on the bench."6 0 Such experience had
revealed both general principles and specific rules according to which
courts could determine the degree of credibility various forms of testi-
mony warranted.
Moore on Facts, as the work came to be known, is a treatise unlike
any other written before or since. 61 Because its purpose is to assist
attorneys and courts in evaluating facts, its chapters list the various
factual circumstances courts have been called upon to consider. The
topics covered range from "Uncontradicted Testimony," 62 "Mem-
ory,"' 63 and "Bias of Witnesses"6 4 to "Sound and Hearing, '65 "Taste,
Smell, and Touch,"6 6 and "The Weather. '67 Some of the section head-
ings in Moore on Facts are so specific, so obviously outdated, or so just
plain odd that they are more likely to strike the modern reader as a
source of humor than as a repository of legal wisdom. 68 Furthermore,
59 1 id. at v.
60 Id.
61 Its closest cousins are WILLS, supra note 23, and JAMES RAM, A TREATISE ON
FACTS AS SUBJECTS OF INQUIRY BY AJURY (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 2d ed. 1982) (1873),
but neither of these works is nearly as systematic in method or as comprehensive in
scope.
62 1 MOORE, supra note 5, at 109.
63 2 id. at 786.
64 Id. at 1224.
65 1 id. at 231.
66 Id. at 358.
67 Id. at 453.
68 See, e.g., id. § 151, at 197 ("Course of Bullets Striking Human Body-Fact ver-
sus Theory"); id. § 161, at 206 ("Travels of a Toddling Infant"); id. § 164, at 208
("Incredibly Quick Comprehension of Long Document"); id. § 202, at 245 ("Church
Bells-Waywardness of Sound-Sensitiveness of Hearers"); id. § 206, at 248 ("Sounds
Attributed to Sexual Intercourse"); id. § 215, at 254 ("Crepitation of Injured Bones");
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some others are downright offensive: Moore classified witnesses, for
instance, not only by race ("Hindus,"69 "Negroes, '70 and "Orientals, in
General,"7 1), but also on the basis of such derogatory category labels
as "Prostitutes,"72 "Opium Fiends, '73 and, worst of all, "Lawyers. '74
Still, Moore showed keen awareness of some of the psychological
defects that infect witness testimony. Much attention has been paid
recently to the mountains of psychological research produced over
the last few decades showing that eyewitness testimony is far less relia-
ble than most people (and thus most jurors) tend to think. 75 But
Moore showed that courts had long recognized this fact. He even
offered explanations for the phenomenon, such as the ease with
which a person's attention may be diverted, 76 the tendency to sup-
plant observation with unconscious inference, 77 and the capacity of a
witness' religious, political, or pecuniary interest to affect uncon-
sciously what he or she observes. 78 Moore was equally aware of the
problems associated with memory. He at one point asserts that he has
"discovered no case where a judge has had the hardihood to extol the
tenacity of memory" and goes on to discuss the various factors affect-
ing memory.79 Because of these and other problems, Moore was con-
cerned that juries might often accord too much weight to testimony
"intrinsically weak" in virtue of the witness' "well-known integrity and
prudent judgment."80 Indeed, the very first section of the treatise is
entitled "Inclination to Give Too Much Weight to Testimony."8'
Moreover, Moore found support in the case law for what appear
to be rules of weight or credibility. Cases are cited for the proposition
that a person's memory of his or her own actions is more reliable than
id. § 309, at 312 ("Person Dazzled by Lights Shining in His Face"); id. § 379, at 359
("Educated Taste of Kentuckians"); id. § 439, at 410 ("Estimate of Speed by Intoxi-
cated Person"); id. § 503, at 472 ("Can Fog Coexist with a Gale?"); 2 id. § 1001, at
1145 ("Sneering Levity"); id. § 1031, at 1164 ("Are Unchaste Women Less Veracious
than Unchaste Men?").
69 2 id. § 1024, at 1160.
70 Id. § 1025, at 1160.
71 Id. § 1022, at 1159.
72 Id. § 1032, at 1165.
73 Id. § 1020, at 1157.
74 Id. § 1019, at 1156.
75 See infra Part II.C.1.
76 2 MooRE, supra note 5, § 693, at 747.
77 Id. § 701, at 757.
78 Id. § 702, at 758.
79 Id. § 728, at 795.
80 1 id. § 17, at 22-23.
81 Id. § 1, at 2.
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another's recollection of them;8 2 that estimates of short periods of
time in which a great deal has occurred are typically inexact; 3 that
testimony about a conversation with a deceased person is considered
weak;8 4 that the testimony of an uncontradicted, disinterested, and
unimpeached witness deserves at least some weight;8 5 that the testi-
mony of a witness who earlier gave contradictory testimony must be
given zero weight;8 6 and that affidavits are liable to abuse because they
are rarely drafted by the witness.8 7
Moore's treatise received some favorable reviews,88 but its most
important reviewer condemned it as "moral treason."8 9 John Henry
Wigmore, who wrote the leading twentieth-century treatise on evi-
dence law, described Moore's work as "partly good," but also partly
"what we should consider as bad as possible."90 Though admiring of
the book's broad scope and potential utility for lawyers, Wigmore saw
"nothing but harm" in Moore's suggestion that there were "rules of law
which determine the weight or credibility of a piece of evidence."9 1 Such a
proposition, he insisted, "is not known to the orthodox and tradi-
tional common law," and its adoption would "wreck our whole system
of proof."9 2 The reason was simple:
If there is one thing for which the common law system ofjudge and
jury stands, it is that the rules of evidence, as determined and
applied by the judge, are rules of admissibility alone, and for the
judge alone; the weight or credibility is for the jurors untrammeled
by any rules of law.93
Today Moore has been almost entirely forgotten, and the only
scholar to discuss his work in any detail has endorsed Wigmore's nega-
82 2 id. § 783, at 870.
83 Id. § 863, at 992.
84 Id. § 877, at 1014.
85 1 id. § 98, at 148-49.
86 2 id. §§ 1073-1074, at 1209.
87 Id. § 941, at 1097.
88 See, e.g., Charles F. Chamberlayne, Book Review, 20 GREEN BAG 627, 627 (1908)
(reviewing MOORE, supra note 5) ("This two-volume work is destined to become a
classic ...."); Kenneth M. Spence, Book Review, 9 COLUM. L. REv. 370, 371 (1909)
(reviewing MOORE, supra note 5) ("[I]t is not too much to say that [Moore] has added
to the existing and available law of evidence almost an entire branch, the usefulness
of which can hardly be overestimated.").
89 Wigmore, supra note 7, at 478.
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tive assessment of it.9 4 William Twining praises Moore's treatise as "a
rich and fascinating compendium," which is "full of delights and
insights," but he says it was based on a "category mistake. '9 5 In sug-
gesting that case law could offer courts "authoritative guidance on the
weight and value of particular kinds of evidence," Moore demon-
strated that his "conception of the enterprise was rather confused."9 6
History thus appears to have judged Wigmore's critique dispositive.
No one since Moore has put forth a serious effort to defend rules of
weight or explain how they might be used.
D. A Response to Wigmore
Such neglect is unfortunate, for Wigmore's wholesale rejection of
rules of weight on the ground that they are inconsistent with trial by
jury was not justified. First, the argument proves far too much
because the jury's role as finder of fact has been, and continues to be,
constrained in a number of respects. Second, there are a variety of
adjudicative contexts in which the finder of fact is not a jury.
1. Discretion-Limiting Devices at Common Law
Although modern evidence law purports to be consistent with
Thayer's proclamation that "law has no mandamus to the logical
faculty, ' 9 7 several types of rules control and manage the information
to which the factfinder has access. 98 First and most obviously, admissi-
bility rules routinely exclude probative evidence. And although many
such rules exclude evidence for reasons of policy irrespective of its
probative value, some evidence is excluded precisely on the ground
that the factfinder is likely to ascribe it more weight than it deserves.
The hearsay rule is a classic example of such a rule, the theory being
that the inability to cross-examine the declarant under oath reduces
the factfinder's ability to assess accurately the reliability of his or her
alleged statements. 99 Furthermore, courts often admit evidence for
94 See TWINING, supra note 8, at 71.
95 Id. at 70-71.
96 Id. at 70.
97 THAYER, supra note 50, at 313 n.1.
98 Professor Damagka has made this point well: "Common law procedure is usu-
ally regarded as the citadel of free evaluation of evidence. .... But this account of the
matter is incomplete and seriously misleading .... Common law was never averse to
instruments aimed at constraining the fact finder's freedom in processing evidence."
DAmASKA, supra note 9, at 17-18.
99 See FED. R. EVID. 801-806; DAmA.SA, supra note 9, at 15 (identifying reliability
concerns as one of the traditional justifications for the hearsay rule); RIcHARD 0.
LEMPERT ET AL., A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 501 (3d ed. 2000) (same).
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one purpose but not another, with the result that the factfinder is
instructed to consider, say, a criminal defendant's reputation for dis-
honesty for the purpose of impeachment but not as substantive evi-
dence that he robbed a bank. 00 In this way, as Professor Mirjan
Damaka puts it, Anglo-American evidence law seeks to "regulat[e]
legally permissible lines of inference."''1 1
Just as the most common admissibility rules limit discretionary
factfinding, so too do substantive rules of law. Whenever a court
decides a question "as a matter of law," the effect is to withdraw from
the jury's consideration what would otherwise be disputable factual
questions and decide them according to a rule of law. In fact, Oliver
Wendell Holmes argued that such was a chief virtue of the common
law method of decisionmaking. On certain kinds of recurring ques-
tions, he maintained, courts should "gradually ... acquire a fund of
experience which enables [the judge] to represent the common sense
of the community in ordinary instances far better than an average
jury."'0 2 Holmes famously put this principle in practice in Baltimore &
Ohio Railroad Co. v. Goodman,10 3 a case in which the Supreme Court
endorsed the notorious "stop, look, and listen" rule for railroad cross-
ing cases. 10 4 Under this rule, rather than ask a jury whether the
defendant had adduced evidence sufficient to establish that the plain-
tiff was contributorily negligent when crossing a railroad track, so long
as the evidence made clear that the plaintiff did not stop and get out
of his car to determine whether the train was "dangerously near," the
court could settle the issue as a matter of law.' 0 5 This particular rule
was soon limited by the Court, 10 6 but the practice is pervasive: when-
ever courts decide cases on the merits at the pleading stage or on a
motion for summary judgment, they generate rules whose effect is to
convert potential questions of fact for juries into questions of law for
courts.
Also common-but more controversial in some contexts-are
legal presumptions. These rules encourage or require factfinders to
100 Compare FED. R. EVID. 404(a) (excluding character evidence generally), with id.
608(a) (permitting character evidence for purposes of impeachment).
101 DAmASKA, supra note 9, at 18.
102 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 124 (Little, Brown & Co.
1923) (1881).
103 275 U.S. 66 (1927).
104 See id. at 69-70.
105 Id. at 70.
106 See Pokora v. Wabash Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 98, 102-06 (1934) (discussing the con-
flicts caused by the Goodman rule and deciding that it cannot be applied generally as a
rule of law).
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infer a fact from circumstantial evidence of that fact. Typical pre-
sumptions in the civil context include the presumption that a
letter mailed to an address was received by the addressee, that the
driver of a vehicle that strikes another vehicle from behind is
negligent, that a person who remains absent from friends and
family for seven years without explanation or communication is dead,
or that a will that cannot be found was revoked by the testator.10 7
Legal presumptions have been more controversial in the criminal con-
text. In a line of cases in the 1970s and 1980s, the Supreme Court
struck down several legislative presumptions that made it easier for
juries to convict on circumstantial evidence.' 08 Precisely how much
evidence is required to defeat a pr esumption is sometimes unclear
and has been the source of much debate, 10 9 but there is little doubt
107 See GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 3.3, at
63-64 (3d ed. 1996).
108 See, e.g., Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 316 (1985) (condemning an instruc-
tion that "' [t] he law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his
voluntary acts"' on the ground that the jury could have construed it as mandatory
(quoting Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 515 (1979))); Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at
515 (striking down a mandatory presumption similar to that at issue in Francis as
applied to a homicide defendant); County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 163-67
(1979) (upholding a permissive presumption that the defendant illegally possessed a
firearm from the fact that it was in her car); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 701-04
(1975) (striking down a state law presumption that shifted the burden to the accused
to prove provocation in a murder trial); Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 405-19
(1970) (striking down a mandatory presumption that the defendant knowingly
imported cocaine from abroad from the fact of his possession of heroin, but uphold-
ing a comparable presumption from heroin possession). For criticism of the Court's
approach and an analysis of presumptions as burden-shifting devices, see Ronald J.
Allen, Structuring Jury Decisionmaking in Criminal Cases: A Unified Constitutional Approach
to Evidentiary Devices, 94 HARV. L. REV. 321, 321-39 (1980); John Calvin Jeffries, Jr. &
Paul B. Stephan III, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law, 88
YALE L.J. 1325, 1365-73 (1979) (suggesting a framework to evaluate the constitution-
ality of defenses and presumptions in the criminal law as they relate to the burden of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt).
109 The issue at the center of the so-called "Thayer-Morgan debate" is essentially
whether the function of a presumption is to shift the burden of persuasion or just the
burden of production. See, e.g., EDMUND MORRIS MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF
UNDER THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF LITIGATION 81 (1956) ("[S]ensible procedure
would require the abandonment of the Thayer doctrine as to presumptions and con-
cede that the establishment of facts which create a presumption does in some situa-
tions and should in most cases fix the burden of persuasion."); Leslie J. Harris,
Constitutional Limits on Criminal Presumptions as an Expression of Changing Concepts of
Fundamental Fairness, 77J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 308, 314 n.22 (1986) (summariz-
ing the debate and citing relevant sources).
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that their use, at least in the civil context, is widespread and
uncontroversial. 1 0
Corroboration rules are similar to presumptions, except that they
apply to direct testimony rather than circumstantial evidence, and
they typically result in either the admission of evidence or the dismis-
sal of the case.' These rules generally require that certain types of
testimony be corroborated in order to sustain a conviction. As men-
tioned above, such rules are no longer particularly common, but they
continue to be used in perjury and treason prosecutions as well as in
those for certain sexual offenses." 12 The Supreme Court recently con-
sidered whether the Constitution's Ex Post Facto Clause applied to
such a rule. In Carmell v. Texas,'1 3 the Court split 5-4 over whether
the expansion of an exception to a Texas corroboration requirement
for the testimony of victims of sexual abuse could be constitutionally
applied to the defendant. 14 Interestingly, the majority and dissent
could not even agree as to how to characterize the rule. The majority
dubbed it a "sufficiency of the evidence rule,"' 1 5 while the dissent saw
it as a traditional admissibility rule. 11 6 In the next Part, we will see why
a better term would be a rule of weight."17
In short, if rules of weight are inconsistent with trial by jury, many
of the evidentiary devices that have become well accepted are equally
so.
2. Rules of Weight and Nonjury Factfinding
Moore himself responded to Wigmore in part by noting that
there are also several adjudicative contexts in which juries are not the
finder of fact.118 In bench trials, on motions for a new trial or
motions challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, or in administra-
tive adjudication (where rules of weight are common),judges are fre-
quently called upon to evaluate evidence-even if they are not always
"finding facts" as a formal matter. Moore's point carries even more
110 See DAMaSKA, supra note 9, at 19 (listing presumptions as one of the "common
law's arsenal of instruments designed to structure the deliberative process").
111 See id. at 18 (mentioning corroboration rules as one of the common law limita-
tions on free proof); TWINING, supra note 8, at 44 (citing corroboration rules as one of
the few contexts in which rules of weight are employed in the common law system).
112 See supra Part I.A.
113 529 U.S. 513 (2000).
114 See id. at 518-19, 552.
115 See id. at 546-47.
116 See id. at 556 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
117 See infra Part II.B.
118 See Charles C. Moore, Correspondence, 3 ILL. L. REv. 583, 584 (1909).
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weight today because jury trials have become exceedingly rare. In
2002, for instance, only 1.2% of all civil dispositions in federal district
courts resulted from jury trials.1 19 Even by 1962, however, that per-
centage had dwindled to 5.5%.120
Perhaps not surprisingly, then, since Moore's writing, various
appellate and trial courts sitting as finders of fact have drawn on sev-
eral of the rules of weight Moore collected in his treatise. Examples
include the rule that inherently incredible testimony is generally not
to be believed; 121 that a witness' memory of his own actions is superior
to that of others; 122 that testimony about a decedent's alleged state-
ments against interest is generally unreliable; 23 that the testimony of
seamen exonerating their master has little weight;124 that the testi-
mony of an uncontradicted, disinterested witness must be accorded
119 Galanter, supra note 11, at 463 tbl.1.
120 Id. at 462 tbl.1.
121 See, e.g., Jackson v. United States, 353 F.2d 862, 867 (D.C. Cir. 1965) ("The
doctrine that appellate courts must reverse findings based upon 'inherently in-
credible' testimony has long been accepted in this jurisdiction."); Trippett v.
Virgin Islands, No. D.C. CRIM. APP. 2004/03, 2004 WL 2988560, at *3 (D.V.I. 2004)
("'Where, however, the testimony of a witness is incredible, inherently or physically
impossible and unbelievable, inherently improbable and irreconcilable with, or con-
trary to physical facts and common observation and experience, where it is so
opposed to all reasonable probabilities as to be manifestly false, or is contrary to the
laws of nature or to well-known scientific principles .... it is to be disregarded as
being without evidentiary value even though uncontradicted."' (alteration in origi-
nal) (quoting Hollis v. Scott, 516 So. 2d 576, 578-79 (Ala. 1987))); Whelen v.
Osgoodby, 50 A. 692, 694 (NJ. Ch. 1901) ("The statement that a man under certain
circumstances did something which we know from experience that not one in a thou-
sand would do under the same circumstances is discredited by the inherent improba-
bility of the statement.").
122 See, e.g., Spear v. United R.Rs. of S.F., 117 P. 956, 965 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1911)
("[P]robability of a higher degree of attention and interest gives rise to a presump-
tion of considerable force that a person's recollection of his act and of attendant
circumstances is more definite and trustworthy than another person's recollection of
it."); State v. Long, 108 A. 36, 37 (Del. Ct. Oyer & Terminer 1919) ("The actor usually
knows better than the observer what he did or did not do, and his testimony is gener-
ally entitled to greater weight.").
123 See, e.g., Herbert v. Lankershim, 71 P.2d 220, 230 (Cal. 1937) (en banc) ("On
the subject of oral admissions, unless corroborated by satisfactory evidence, this
court ... rates it as the weakest of testimony that can be produced." (citation
omitted)).
124 See, e.g., The Aakre, 122 F.2d 469, 476 (2d Cir. 1941) ("Cargo has a slim chance
at best, for it must rely exclusively on the testimony of the ship's officers and crew as
to what preceded the casualty; and admiralty courts have often recognized that such
witnesses almost invariably will testify on behalf of their ship."); Willis v. Pa. R.R. Co.,




some weight by ajury; 125 and that ajury may disregard a witness' testi-
mony when it contradicts the witness' own conduct. 126 In each of
these cases, the court cited a case or treatise (often Moore's) in sup-
port of its generalization about the reliability of certain forms of
testimony.
And today, administrative agencies quite commonly rely on rules
of weight. For instance, according to a well-known rule that the Social
Security Administration uses in adjudicating benefits claims, the testi-
mony of the treating physician is generally deemed to have more
weight than that of other physicians. 127 Similarly, the Court of Fed-
eral Claims has held that the records of a family physician deserve
more weight than oral testimony offered later.1 28 The United States
125 See, e.g., Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Martin, 283 U.S. 209, 216 (1931) ("We
recognize the general rule, of course, as stated by both courts below, that the question
of the credibility of witnesses is one for the jury alone; but this does not mean that the
jury is at liberty, under the guise of passing upon the credibility of a witness, to disre-
gard his testimony, when from no reasonable point of view is it open to doubt.");
Cruz-Vargas v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 348 F.3d 271, 277 (1st Cir. 2003) (noting
that a witness' "testimony is furthermore neither improbable nor contradicted, thus
falling under the established principle that 'testimony concerning a simple fact, capa-
ble of contradiction, not incredible, and standing uncontradicted, unimpeached, or
in no way discredited by cross-examination, must be permitted to stand"' (quoting
Chi., Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Howell, 401 F.2d 752, 754 (10th Cir. 1968)));
Broad. Music, Inc. v. Havana Madrid Rest. Corp., 175 F.2d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 1949)
(upholding the judgment of a trial court on the ground that the court "had the
'uncontradicted witness' rule in mind, and, accordingly, pointed to the witness' inter-
est and to the lack of corroboration in order to bring the case within the exception").
126 See, e.g., Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Alexander, 436 S.W.2d 829, 836 (Ark. 1969)
("When the conduct of any witness is clearly inconsistent with his testimony and not
satisfactorily explained, the trier of facts is justified in disbelieving the testimony.");
Field v. Koonce, 12 S.W.2d 772, 775 (Ark. 1929) ("'Conduct of a witness clearly incon-
sistent with his testimony and not satisfactorily explained is one of the most fatal spe-
cies of impeachment.'" (quoting 2 MooRE, supra note 5, § 1136)).
127 See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) (2007) ("Generally, we give more weight to
opinions from your treating sources, since these sources are likely to be the medical
professionals most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of your medical
impairment(s) and may bring a unique perspective to the medical evidence that can-
not be obtained from the objective medical findings alone or from reports of individ-
ual examinations, such as consultative examinations or brief hospitalizations.");
Robinson v. Barnhart, 366 F.3d 1078, 1084 (10th Cir. 2004) ("The opinion of an
examining physician is generally entitled to less weight than that of a treating physi-
cian, and the opinion of an agency physician who has never seen the claimant is
entitled to the least weight of all."). But see Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord,
538 U.S. 822, 829-34 (2003) (holding that the treating physician rule does not apply
to ERISA claims).
128 See, e.g., Estate of Arrowood v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 28
Fed. Cl. 453, 458 (1993) (noting that the rules of evidence do not apply to special
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International Trade Commission has held that the testimony of the
employees of an owner of an alleged trademark is not accorded much
weight. 129 For analogous reasons, the Environmental Protection
Agency generally gives little weight to self-serving statements by corpo-
rate officers about a company's ability to pay a fine. 130 All of these
doctrines constitute efforts by agencies to establish rules or guidelines
as to how much probative value certain types of testimony ought to be
accorded.
The above discussion does not establish that rules of weight are a
pervasive feature of common law adjudication. Outside the agency
context, the number of cases in which civil and criminal courts have
employed rules of weight in the way Moore envisioned is relatively
low. But it does suggest that despite our rhetoric about the impor-
tance of juries, most adjudication in this country takes place without
them. And when a jury is used, its discretion is curbed in a variety of
ways. Given such a state of affairs, analyzing the virtues and vices of
rules of weight seems worthwhile. Of course, the relative significance
of the jury is not equal in all adjudicative contexts, so to the extent
that rules of weight do limit jury discretion, their use may well require
limitation in some contexts more than others. Using certain rules of
weight in criminal trials, for instance, may implicate Sixth Amend-
ment concerns not present elsewhere. But unless one doubts the con-
stitutionality of virtually any limitation on the right to a jury trial,13'
masters and that "a record created in the normal course by an employee of the family
physician should receive more weight than oral testimony given years after the
event"); see also Hoag v. Sec'y of Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 94-67V, 1998
WL 408783, at *3 (Fed. Cl. Apr. 22, 1998) ("The Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit has counseled the Special Masters that medical records should be given more
weight than conflicting oral testimony offered after the fact.").
129 See, e.g., Certain Braiding Machs., USITC Pub. 1435, Inv. No. 337-TA-130 (Oct.
1983) ("Generally speaking, little weight is accorded to the testimony of an employee
of the owner of the alleged trademark because of the potential risk that the percep-
tions conveyed are colored by bias.").
130 See, e.g., Zaclon, Inc., No. RCRA-05-2004-0019, 2006 EPA ALJ LEXIS 23, at
*23 (May 23, 2006) ("[S]elf-serving testimony by corporate officers, uncorroborated
by documentation, is generally given little weight regarding inability to pay."); F & K
Plating Co., 2 E.A.D. 443, 449 (1987) (noting that "although unsupported self-serving
testimony is generally entitled to little weight," the presiding officer had met his bur-
den of proving that he could not pay the fine); Cent. Paint & Body Shop, Inc., 2
E.A.D. 309, 315 (1987) ("Self-serving declarations are entitled to little weight.").
131 See, e.g., Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L.
REV. 139, 145-60 (2007) (arguing that the common law in 1791 had no mechanism
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using such rules does not seem to threaten the very foundations of
Anglo-American evidence law in the way Wigmore feared.
There are, however, other powerful objections to the use of rules
of weight that do not depend on the jury's role in our system. Thus,
while recognizing thatjudges and juries are actors with different intel-
lectual capacities who possess distinct institutional advantages and dis-
advantages,1 32 the balance of this Article takes up the more general
question of whether using rules to weigh the credibility of testimony
may be beneficial for adjudicative factfinding, irrespective of whether
the factfinder is a judge or jury.
II. THE CASE FOR RULES OF WEIGHT
Answering this question requires first clarifying what rules of
weight are and how exactly they differ from other, related evidentiary
devices. It then requires showing how such rules may improve adjudi-
cative factfinding by making it more accurate, fair, and efficient. Let
me begin by explaining how the term "rule" is used throughout.
A. Rules in General
Rules are, first and foremost, generalizations. As Professor Fred
Schauer puts it, they "speak to types and not to particulars."'133 But
rules are not just generalizations, they are entrenched generalizations.
To say that a generalization is entrenched is to say that it exerts norma-
tive force-that is, provides a reason for action-even in circum-
stances where following the rule would not appear to fulfill its
underlying justification.13 4 Importantly, this conception of a rule is
sufficiently broad to include two types of directives with which rules
are sometimes contrasted. 35 First, it includes so-called "rules of
similar to summary judgment and the practice is unconstitutional in violating the
Seventh Amendment).
132 Most obviously, judges are repeat players and thus may develop skills and hab-
its that jurors likely do not. See Mitchell, supra note 15, at 1122 ("[J]udges are effec-
tively repeat players for most judgment and decision problems, whereas juries are
not.").
133 FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES 18 (1991).
134 See id. at 47-49.
135 For a proponent of the view that a directive only qualifies as a rule if it applies
in every case, see RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 24 (1977) ("Rules are
applicable in an all-or-nothing fashion. If the facts a rule stipulates are given, then
either the rule is valid, in which case the answer it supplies must be accepted, or it is
not, in which case it contributes nothing to the decision."). For a discussion distin-
guishing between rules and standards, see Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An
Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE LJ. 557 (1992).
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thumb"-that is, rules that do not necessarily require application in
every case in which the factual predicate for the rule holds. As Profes-
sor Schauer explains, if a rule of thumb requires that the rule-follower
attain a higher degree of certainty before deviating from the rule,
then it exerts normative force.136 Whether rules of thumb count as
rules matters because many rules of both weight and admissibility are
rules of thumb. 137
More important, this conception of rules includes directives that
are framed in broad or open-ended language and are thus frequently
dubbed "standards." This inclusion is warranted because the key issue
in determining whether a decision can accurately be described as rule-
guided is whether the rule itself makes a difference to the deci-
sionmaker, not simply whether it is verbally specific. 138 To use the
classic example, if the paradigmatic rule is a fifty-five miles per hour
speed limit and the equivalent standard requires that people "drive
reasonably," a directive that instructs drivers to "drive very slowly" on a
wide-open road may very well do normative work and could thus qual-
ify as a rule despite the vagueness of its terms. 139 In fact, many rules of
weight are of this sort insofar as they instruct the factfinder to accord
"low weight" to a certain class of evidence or simply assert that it is
"generally unreliable.' 40 In short, whether a rule of weight ought to
be an absolute rule or a mere rule of thumb and whether it ought to
be framed in precise language or vague language are important fac-
tors to be considered in devising it, but such considerations point to
variations among, not alternatives to, rules of weight.
This definition also allows us to distinguish rules of weight from
the closely related legal doctrine of judicial comment, which permits
judges to give their opinion to the jury about evidence presented at
136 See SCHAUER, supra note 133, at 106.
137 See, e.g., FED. R. EID. 611 (b) (limiting the scope of cross examination to those
matters covered in direct examination or matters affecting witness credibility but sub-
jecting such limitation to the discretion of the judge, who may "permit inquiry into
additional matters as if on direct examination"); infra notes 154-56 and accompany-
ing text (discussing rules of weight that are rules of thumb).
138 See SCHAUER, supra note 133, at 104 n.35 (noting that "the impact of rules on
the behavior of decision-makers is more than can be captured in a dimension of speci-
ficity and vagueness").
139 Thus, even Professor Kaplow, whose conception of a rule places less signifi-
cance on a directive's generality than on whether its content is determined before or
after its application, stresses that a law that uses broad language, such as one that
prohibits "vulgar behavior," may plausibly be interpreted as a rule to the extent that
rule-followers would agree on what likely constitutes such behavior. See Kaplow, supra
note 135, at 601.
140 See supra text accompanying notes 121-26.
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trial.14 1 Ajudge who simply opines to the jury that "witness A strikes
me as untrustworthy and his testimony utterly implausible" is in no
sense applying a rule. The difference is obvious but important,
because whereas judicial comment only makes sense in the context of
a bifurcated tribunal (since one can hardly "comment" to one's self),
rules of weight can be employed whether the factfinder and the legal
decisionmaker are the same or not. Furthermore, objections that
hold for one practice may not necessarily hold for the other. Indeed,
it is precisely in virtue of their status as entrenched generalizations
that many critics object to rules of weight.1 4 2
B. Rules of Weight
In Part I, I surveyed a variety of evidentiary devices that constrain
the jury's discretion in one way or another. There I also promised to
explain why a corroboration rule was better described as a rule of
weight than a sufficiency of the evidence rule. Here I will make good
on that promise and also show how rules of weight differ from legal
presumptions and admissibility rules. A more precise conception of
rules of weight will thus emerge.
1. Corroboration Rules and Sufficiency Rules
At first glance, a corroboration rule that prevents a case from
reaching a jury unless a certain type of testimony is corroborated
seems to be a quite different sort of rule than one that allows evidence
to be submitted to the jury with an instruction to accord it "low
weight." Whereas the latter rule attempts to guide the factfinding pro-
cess, the former seems to bypass that process altogether. Perhaps for
this reason, the Court in Carmell called the Texas corroboration rule
at issue in that case a "sufficiency of the evidence rule."1 4 3 The term is
141 Professor Ren~e Lerner has documented well the decline ofjudicial comment
in this country. See generally Ren~e Lettow Lerner, The Transformation of the American
Civil Trial: The Silent Judge, 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 195, 241-61 (2000) (documenting
the decline of judicial comment in this country).
142 But for others, judicial comment is only legitimate insofar as it entails the
application of a rule of weight. See Spalding v. Lowe, 23 N.W. 46, 48 (Mich. 1885)
("As a general rule, it is improper for the trial judge to instruct the jury that the
evidence of one witness is deserving of more weight than that of another. In doing so
he invades the province of the jury, whose function it is to determine from the evi-
dence whether any fact in issue is sufficiently proved or not .... He may, however,
define the weight which the law attaches to a whole class of testimony,-for instance, that of
accomplices,-but he may not single out certain testimony and tell the jury it is enti-
tled to much or little weight." (emphasis added)).
143 Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 517-18 (2000).
2oo8]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
not inaccurate, because the rule purports to make a judgment as to
the conditions that must hold for a given type of evidence (in this
case, the testimony of a victim of sexual assault) to be sufficient to
sustain a conviction. Still, the term is somewhat misleading both
because its meaning is ambiguous and because not all corroboration
rules are sufficiency rules.
The term is ambiguous because courts distinguish between the
legal and factual sufficiency of evidence. A verdict is said to be legally
insufficient when, for instance, the court improperly instructs the jury
so that its judgment about the evidence is premised on a misunder-
standing or omission of one of the statutory elements of the crime.
144
A verdict is factually insufficient when the weight of the evidence does
not support the conviction even under a proper view of the law, per-
haps because the only evidence offered was the testimony of one inter-
ested witness and a few pieces of circumstantial evidence. 145 This
distinction holds even though, under Jackson v. Virginia,146 it is techni-
cally legal error for a jury to convict a defendant when the verdict is
not supported by the weight of the evidence.1 47
The corroboration rule in Carmell is concerned only with the fac-
tual sufficiency of the evidence. That is, it reflects the legislature's
concern about the evidentiary reliability of a certain class of testimony
and its preference for placing the risk of factfinding error associated
with such testimony on the prosecution rather than the criminal
144 See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 312 (1957) (reversing a jury's
conviction under the Smith Act on the ground that the only evidence offered in sup-
port of one of the elements occurred at a time beyond the applicable statute of limita-
tions), overruled in part by Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 10 (1978).
145 See Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 58-59 (1991).
146 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
147 See id. at 318-19; see also Griffin, 502 U.S. at 58-59 ("Insufficiency of proof... is
legal error."). Texas is one state where courts have distinguished carefully between
legal and factual insufficiency. Compare Mar. Overseas Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402,
407 (Tex. 1998) (explaining, in reversing a trial court on factual insufficiency
grounds, that "the court of appeals must detail all the evidence relevant to the issue
and clearly state why the jury's finding is factually insufficient or so against the great
weight and preponderance of the evidence that it is manifestly unjust"), with Merrell
Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex. 1997) (noting that a court
may reverse ajudgment on a legal insufficiency or "no evidence" challenge where "(a)
there is a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact, (b) the court is barred by rules
of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital
fact, (c) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla, or
(d) the evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of the vital fact"). For further
information on this distinction, see Harvey Brown, Procedural Issues Under Daubert, 36




defendant.1 4 8 It does not reflect a policy judgment as to what conduct
ought to be punished and what ought not; surely the state of Texas
would like all sexual offenders to be punished if possible. 149 Of
course, as this example makes clear, to say that a corroboration rule is
primarily concerned with the reliability of testimony does not mean
that its sole purpose is to increase the accuracy of verdicts. The rule
may be designed not only to reduce factfinding errors, but also to
allocate fairly the risks of such errors or to minimize the cost of reduc-
ing them.1 50 Still, the purpose is evidently to regulate to the factfind-
ing process.
A legal sufficiency of the evidence rule, on the other hand, would
simply amount to a substantive rule of law. A court might hold, for
instance, that evidence showing that a defendant who secured a vic-
tim's consent to get into his car by fraud or deceit is insufficient to
constitute "forced asportation" for the purposes of a kidnapping stat-
ute. 15 1 Such a holding may be called a "sufficiency of the evidence
rule" because, if there is no evidence of physical force, then the ver-
dict is in error. But this is true not because of any defect in the evi-
dence or the jury's evaluation of it, but because courts have decided as
a matter of substantive law that such facts do not amount to forced
asportation. 152
Corroboration rules such as those in Carmell are, then, factual suf-
ficiency of the evidence rules,, but they are also rules of weight that
serve a function very similar to those rules-such as those cited in
Part I from Moore's treatise-that call for certain evidence to be
admitted but only as a lower grade of evidence.1 53 The difference
between the two types of rules is exaggerated by the fact that in Anglo-
American law, factfinding takes place in a bifurcated tribunal so that
the judge must make an initial determination as to whether there is
sufficient evidence to get to a jury. But it is not difficult to see that a
148 See STEIN, supra note 9, at 208.
149 Perhaps it is more accurate to say that Texas would like to punish all sex
offenders possible at a reasonable social cost.
150 See STEIN, supra note 9, at 1.
151 In this context, asportation means the taking of a person. The example comes
from People v. Green, 609 P.2d 468, 507 (Cal. 1980) (en banc) ("To constitute consent
on the part of a person to a criminal act or transaction, he must act freely and volun-
tarily and not under the influence of fraud, threats, force or duress." (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted)).
152 See People v. Guiton, 847 P.2d 45, 52 (Cal. 1993) (en banc) (concluding that a
verdict is legally insufficient where "the inadequacy is legal, not merely factual, that is,
when the facts do not state a crime under the applicable statute ... absent a basis in
the record to find that the verdict was actually based on a valid ground").
153 See supra notes 58-87 and accompanying text.
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rule that deems a certain type of testimony to be "of low weight" or
"generally unreliable" will in most cases be functionally analogous to a
rule that deems the same testimony "generally insufficient to sustain a
verdict on its own."
And this points to the second reason why corroboration rules are
better described as rules of weight than as sufficiency of the evidence
rules. Not all corroboration rules are, strictly speaking, sufficiency
rules. Instead, some corroboration rules serve as rules of thumb as to
the likely adequacy of the evidence in a way comparable to the rules
described in the previous paragraph. For instance, one corroboration
requirement that existed in England until recently required that, if
the testimony of an accomplice was uncorroborated by other evi-
dence, the judge was to instruct the jury that it was "dangerous" to
convict purely on the basis of such testimony.154 Similarly, the Board
of Immigration Appeals has interpreted the regulations governing asy-
lum petitions to require that "where it is reasonable to expect cor-
roborating evidence for certain alleged facts [e.g., of persecution in
the applicant's country of origin] pertaining to the specifics of an
applicant's claim, such evidence should be provided."' 55 But if the
applicant cannot produce such corroborating evidence, the result is
not a denied application; instead, the applicant has the opportunity to
explain her failure to do so.156
Thus, the relevant distinction is not between rules of weight, on
the one hand, and corroboration and sufficiency rules, on the other.
Rather, the distinction is between those rules of weight that call for
evidence to be admitted to the factfinder, but only as a lower grade of
evidence, and those rules whose application deems a particular class
of evidence to be insufficient to sustain a verdict in all cases. We may
call the former type defeasible rules of weight and the latter absolute
rules of weight. Whether a rule of weight deserves to be called a "cor-
roboration rule" simply depends on whether or not the rule issues
even when corroborating evidence is presented.
154 See CORROBORATION OF EVIDENCE, supra note 27, at 3-7.
155 S-M-J-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 722, 725 (1997). The relevant regulations can be found
at 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a) (2007).
156 See S-M-J-, 211. & N. Dec. at 725. Of course, the distinction can be a fine one.
The BIA rule could plausibly be reinterpreted as a type of sufficiency rule according
to which an application must be denied where it is reasonable to expect corroborat-




2. Presumptions and Admissibility Rules
It may appear that rules of weight are simply a subclass of legal
presumptions. Like rules of weight, presumptions may also be either
mandatory or permissive.' 57 And, to be sure, a hypothetical rule of
weight that deems DNA evidence to be of more weight than finger-
print evidence could plausibly be described as a "presumption" that
the former is more reliable than the latter on the issue of identifica-
tion. In fact, though, most legal presumptions work somewhat differ-
ently than rules of weight. A presumption encourages or requires the
factfinder to draw particular inferences from one fact in order to
establish the existence of another fact regardless of the type of evidence
used to establish the first fact. Rules of weight, on the other hand,
apply to specific types of evidence, such as written affidavits15 8 or cer-
tain classes of witness testimony.1 59 In other words, the purpose of
rules of weight, but not legal presumptions, is to grade the reliability
of certain classes of evidence.
Of course, the purpose of some common admissibility rules, such
as the hearsay rule or the original documents rule, 160 is also to
account for the reliability of evidence. Conversely, a corroboration
rule might be interpreted as a type of conditional admissibility rule
since, if the corroboration requirement is met, the testimony is admit-
ted without any special instruction or qualification. 61 So it may seem
that rules of weight ought to be classed as a type of admissibility rule.
But rules of weight differ in important respects from admissibility
rules. First, many admissibility rules are not about evidentiary weight
at all. Those admissibility rules whose purpose is entirely unrelated to
factfinding (at least in the case at hand), such as the various eviden-
tiary privileges, which exclude information on the ground that admit-
ting it might have harmful policy consequences, are not rules of
157 In fact, there are more types of presumptions than just these two. See LEMPERT
ET AL., supra note 99, at 1295-306 (analyzing various types of presumptions and
explaining how each functions relative to the burdens of production and persuasion).
158 See 2 MooRE, supra note 5, § 941, at 1097-99.
159 See supra notes 121-26.
160 See FED. R. EVID. 801-802 (defining and generally excluding hearsay evidence);
id. 804(b) (enumerating hearsay exceptions); id. 1001 (requiring the "best evidence"
available); id. 1004 (providing exceptions to the original document rules).
161 See Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 564 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (argu-
ing that a Texas corroboration rule was best interpreted as a conditional rule of
admissibility according to which "the testimony of the victim shall be inadmissible to
prove the defendant's guilt unless corroborated" (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
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weight.162 Second, and more important, whereas rules of admissibility
offer only one remedy when applied-exclusion of the evidence from
the factfinding process-rules of weight admit of two further possibili-
ties: the evidence may be admitted as a lower grade of evidence
(defeasible rules of weight) or it may settle the issue as a matter of law
(absolute rules of weight).
Table 1 summarizes the above discussion. Only the rules in the
lower-middle and right-hand cells are rules of weight.
TABLE 1.
Consequences of Applying Rule
Excludes Evidenee Admits as Lower Form Settles Issue as Matter of Law
of Proof
F Substantive Rules of Law or
Policy/ Admissibility Rules Xt  "legal sufficiency of the
Substantive (e.g., Privileges) evidence rules" (e.g., fraud
is not forced asportation)
Defeasible Absolute Rules of Weight
Weight/ Admissibility Rules Rules of Weight or "factual sufficiency of the
Evidentiary (e.g., Hearsay) (e.g., Moore's rules, evidence rules" (e.g.,BIA corroboration Carmell corroboration rule)
rule)
*t Whether rules of weight do and should serve independent policy goals is
for the most part not considered in this Article, though I raise the question
in the conclusion.
C. Potential Benefits of Rules of Weight
The dominant trend in evidence scholarship over the past couple
of centuries has been toward a system of "free proof' in which rules
play an increasingly minor role.163 Recently, however, some scholars
have recognized that rules may play a crucial function in regulating
factfinding. These scholars argue that the traditional virtues of rule-
based decisionmaking in the context of substantive law apply with
equal force in the factfinding domain. Below I explain how rules in
162 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403 (excluding evidence with a prejudicial effect that
substantially outweighs its probative value); see also STEIN, supra note 9, at 30 (arguing
that, for the reason stated in the text, such rules ought to be excluded from the
domain of evidence law).
163 See STEIN, supra note 9, at 108 (noting that the "abolitionist claim has perme-
ated legal discourse for approximately two centuries").
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general may be beneficial for factfinding and then argue that rules of
weight, specifically, may help improve the accuracy, fairness, and effi-
ciency of factfinding.
1. Accuracy of Verdicts
Rules are typically said to be over- and underinclusive with
respect to their underlying rationales-and thus lead to less accurate
decisions than do standards. Professor Louis Kaplow, however, has
shown that such a judgment assumes that rules are simple, which is
not necessarily the case. If a rule is sufficiently complex and takes into
account all relevant factors bearing on a question, Kaplow explains, it
may be that it results in more accurate decisions than a more open-
ended standard, especially if the rule-follower, when left employing
such a standard, would not appropriately consider all the relevant fac-
tors. 16 4 Thus, rules will improve the accuracy of decisions on balance
in contexts where the decisionmaker is prone to make more errors
when using his or her discretion than result from any over- or under-
inclusiveness of rules.1 65
Adjudicative factfinding may well be such a domain. On almost
any account of evidence law, a primary, though certainly not exclu-
sive, goal of evidence law is and ought to be the production of accu-
rate verdicts.1 66 And the danger that jurors will misevaluate the
evidence and reach inaccurate verdicts is the classic justification for
rules of admissibility. 167 But Professor Schauer has suggested recently
that it is not only jurors who would benefit from the discretion-con-
straining effect of rules. 168 Citing an impressive body of cognitive psy-
chology literature showing both that individuals are prone to a variety
164 See Kaplow, supra note 135, at 594.
165 See SCHAUER, supra note 133, at 150.
166 See TWINING, supra note 8, at 76 tbl.1 (listing as one of the common assump-
tions of the "rationalist tradition" of evidence scholarship the view that "[t]he pursuit
of truth (i.e. seeking to maximize accuracy in fact-determination) is to be given a
high, but not necessarily an overriding, priority in relation to other values, such as the
security of the state, the protection of family relationships or the curbing of coercive
methods of interrogation"); see also LARRY LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW
1 (2006) (arguing that one of the "basic aims" of criminal procedural law is "to find
out the truth about a crime and thus avoid false verdicts"). But see STEIN, supra note 9,
at x ("[T]he key function of evidence law is to apportion the risk of error in condi-
tions of uncertainty, rather than facilitate the discovery of the truth.").
167 See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EviDENCE UNDER THE
RULES 1 (5th ed. 2004) ("[M]istrust ofjuries is the single overriding reason for the law
of evidence.").
168 See Frederick Schauer, On the Supposed Jury-Dependence of Evidence Law, 155 U.
PA. L. REv. 165, 187 (2006).
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of cognitive errors and that experts in particular tend to overestimate
their own professional judgments, Schauer challenges the conven-
tional wisdom that rules of admissibility need only apply in jury
trials. 169
Schauer does not himself suggest using rules of weight in
factfinding, but doing so would likely be a far more effective remedy
for the problem he identifies. 170 For when ajudge serves as both legal
decisionmaker and factfinder, it may be impossible for her to ignore
entirely a piece of evidence she has deemed inadmissible. Instead,
judges probably discount such evidence, noting its potential probative
value while recognizing its weaker credentials. 17' Thus, such situa-
tions seem to call naturally for rules of weight, rather than rules of
exclusion. Still, any argument that rules of weight would be effective
in this way requires a more thorough explanation of what cognitive
defects judges (and juries) might suffer from and how these rules
could cure such defects.
a. Base Rates and Weight
The idea that humans are not perfectly rational creatures is
hardly new, but only in the last thirty years have researchers rigorously
analyzed the precise ways in which people systematically fail to satisfy
certain normative standards of rationality. By now the impressive
body of "heuristics and biases" research within cognitive psychology,
most famously developed by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, is
old news among legal scholars.1 72 It has inspired a whole new field of
behavioral economics, which focuses on the ways in which people's
actual consumption choices and behavior deviate from the traditional
models of rational preference maximization used in decision theory
and economics. 73 It is even older news among evidence scholars,
169 See id at 186-92.
170 In her response to Schauer's piece, Professor Mnookin makes this point. See
Mnookin, supra note 9, at 142 (noting that "it might be that without a bifurcated
tribunal, the only rules of evidence that could genuinely operate as rules during a
bench trial would be rules of assessment rather than admissibility").
171 For empirical support for this claim, see infra note 204 and accompanying text.
172 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1124-31 (1974). A search for "Tversky /s Kahneman"
within US Law Reviews and Journals, Combined yielded 1357 results on LexisNexis;
.availability heuristic" yielded 514; "hindsight bias" yielded 621; "endowment effect"
yielded 674; "framing effect" yielded 403; "representativeness heuristic"-the most
relevant heuristic for our purposes-yielded 218 (last accessed Mar. 26, 2008).
173 See, e.g., Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL
STUD. 199, 203 (2006);JeffreyJ. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternal-
ism, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 1165, 1170-75 (2003).
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who have long recognized its potential impact for adjudicative
factfinding.174
To summarize crudely, this research suggests that when people
make predictions or probabilistic estimates, they focus too much on
particulars and not enough on abstract information.1 75 More specifi-
cally, when people are asked to make conditional probability estimates
(i.e., to determine the probability of an hypothesis H, given evidence
E), they tend not to take sufficient account of either the base rate of H
(how likely H is before E is considered) or the weight of E (how relia-
bly E correlates with H). To see these concepts at work, imagine a
gumball guru who can predict with eighty percent accuracy what color
gumball will be dispensed by a gumball machine. If the gumball
machine has seventy-five blue gumballs and twenty-five red gumballs,
then the base rate of red gumballs is twenty-five percent, while the
weight or reliability of the guru's prediction is eighty percent. By using
the Bayes Theorem, one can calculate the probability that the gumball
will be red when the guru predicts that it will be red.' 76
174 See Mitchell, supra note 15, at 1066 n.1 (citing sources and noting that evi-
dence scholars were the first to recognize the potential significance of the heuristics
and biases research program for the legal system); see also sources cited supra note 15.
175 See, e.g., Dale Griffin & Roger Beuhler, Frequency Probability and Prediction: Easy
Solutions to Cognitive Illusions, 38 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 48, 49 (1999) (describing the
psychological phenomenon of looking to particular cases rather than sets of cases as
the "power of the particular"); Daniel Kahneman & Dan Lovallo, Timid Choices and
Bold Forecasts: A Cognitive Perspective on Risk Taking, 39 MGMT. ScI. 17, 22-23 (1993)
(claiming that decisionmakers are excessively prone to treat problems as unique and
to neglect background statistical information); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky,
Intuitive Prediction: Biases and Corrective Procedures, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY
414, 415 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) (finding that in making predictions
people rely not enough on general "distributional data" and too much on evidence
about particular cases); Gideon Keren, On the Ability of Monitoring Non-Veridical Percep-
tions and Uncertain Knowledge: Some Calibration Studies, 67 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 95, 115
(1988) (finding that subjects were more likely to be overconfident about intellectual
tasks than perceptual ones); Richard E. Nisbett et al., Popular Induction: Information Is
Not Necessarily Informative, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra, at 101, 111-12
(speculating that a variety of psychological findings in heuristics research can be
explained by the fact that people tend to ignore information that is "remote, pallid
and abstract" and pay attention to that which is "vivid, salient and concrete").
176 First, we must assume that the machine dispenses gumballs randomly, that
each ball is replaced after it is dispensed, and that the guru does not know how many
of each color gumball are in the machine (perhaps because the machine is opaque).
Let P(R) refer to the base rate of red balls, i.e., the probability of a red gumball being
dispensed at random, which in this case is 0.25. And let G refer to the guru's predic-
tion that a gumball is red. So P(GR/R) represents the probability that the guru will
correctly predict a gumball to be red when the ball is in fact red. This measures the
weight or reliability of the guru's predictions, and here that value is 0.8. Let us also
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This example helps distinguish between two senses of the term
"weight." In a broad sense, weight simply refers to the probative value
or predictive validity of any relevant class or piece of evidence in mak-
ing a probabilistic judgment. In that sense, one could speak intelligi-
bly of the need to give appropriate weight to base rates in making
certain predictions or according proper weight to circumstantial evi-
dence in a crime trial. But weight in the narrower sense refers to the
reliability of direct evidence of something. That is, it measures how
reliably something that purports to indicate when X is true or when X
occurs is in fact probative of X being true or X occurring. Weight in
this sense describes the relationship between a witness' testimony and
the facts to which that witness is testifying. In the example above, it
measures the gumball guru's predictive accuracy.
That people pay insufficient attention to base rates in making
predictions is now widely known and its consequences for forensic
factfinding much discussed. But human errors in accounting for the
weight or reliability of evidence are no less common. In one study, for
instance, subjects were asked to predict a hypothetical student's
choice of graduate school based on a description of him that had
been itself based on psychological test he took in high school.177
When told that the student had chosen a different field than the one
they had predicted and asked to explain why that might be, most sub-
jects either looked to other aspects of the description to explain his
choice in graduate work or hypothesized alternative psychological
motivations for his choice of school other than intellectual fit.178 Very
few subjects considered (1) the overall distribution of people in the
various graduate schools (i.e., the base rate) or (2) the predictive
assume that the probability that he will guess it to be red when it is really blue, or
P(GRIB), is 0.2. What we are looking for is the probability that the ball is red, given
the new evidence that the guru has predicted it to be red, or P(R/CR). According to
the Bayes formula, P(R/GR) = [P(R) x P(GR1R)]/([P(R) x P(GJR)] + [P(B) x P(GJB)]).
Plugging those numbers in, we get: (0.25 x 0.8)/[(0.25 x 0.8) + (0.75 x 0.2)] = 0.571.
So, if the gumball guru predicts that the gumball will be red, there is about a 57%
chance that it will in fact be red. See generally G.A. Barnard, Thomas Bayes's Essay
Towards Solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances, 45 BIOMEl IuA 293 (1958) (repro-
ducing and explaining the Bayes Theorem).
177 The findings of this study were discussed in two separate papers. See Daniel
Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Psychology of Prediction, 80 PSYCHOL. REV. 237,
238-39 (1973) [hereinafter Kahneman & Tversky, Prediction]; Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Causal Schemas in Judgment Under Uncertainty, inJUDGMENT UNDER UNCER-
TAiNT',r, supra note 175, at 117, 117-28 [hereinafter Tversky & Kahneman, Causal
Schemas].
178 See Tversky & Kahneman, Causal Scehmas, supra note 177, at 127-28.
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validity (i.e., weight) of such personality tests as possible explanations
for the discrepancy. 179
In another study, researchers measured whether and to what
extent subjects took the size of a sample into account in making pre-
dictive judgments. 180 They asked the subjects to make a probabilistic
judgment as to the likelihood that a given coin, when spun, was biased
in favor of heads or tails. In this context, the "weight" of the evidence
is the sample size (i.e., total number of times the coin is flipped), and
the "strength" of the evidence is the proportion of heads to tails.
18 1
The researchers provided the subjects with sample tosses of a variety
of different weights and strengths and, relative to what Bayesian analy-
sis requires, they found that (1) the predictions were relatively inelas-
tic to the weight or sample size, with the result that (2) subjects
systematically overestimated the likelihood of bias when the strength
was high and the weight was low. 18 2 This and comparable studies led
the researchers to conclude that "people assess their confidence in
one of two competing hypotheses on the basis of their balance of
arguments for and against this hypothesis, with insufficient regard for
the quality of the data."' 83 They thus speculated that when people
evaluate a letter of recommendation they tend to pay too much atten-
tion to how glowing or damning the recommendation is and insuffi-
ciently account for the writer's limited knowledge of the subject of
it. 184
These findings are also consistent with the numerous studies
comparing clinical and actuarial forms of predictive and diagnostic
judgments.1 85 These studies suggest that when experts in such fields
179 Kahneman & Tversky, Prediction, supra note 177, at 239. Of course, it would
not be fair to assume that the subjects knew as an empirical matter what such a distri-
bution looked like, but the point is that they did not even consider their own subjec-
tive view of graduate school distribution. A control group in the experiment suggests
that most students believed there to be many more students in the humanities and
education than in computer science and engineering. See id. at 238.
180 See Dale Griffin & Amos Tversky, The Weighing of Evidence and the Determinants of
Confidence, 24 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 411, 414 (1992).
181 Id.
182 See id. at 416.
183 Id. at 425.
184 See id. at 413; see also Griffin & Beuhler, supra note 175, at 75 (stating that "in
making real life predictions and judgments, the problem is . . . in choosing what
information to use and how to weigh and combine the information").
185 See, e.g., Sarah Lictenstein & Baruch Fischhoff, Do Those Who Know More Also
Know More About How Much They Know?, 20 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORM-
ANCE 159, 180-81 (1977); Stuart Oskamp, Overconfidence in Case-Study Judgments, 29J.
CONSULTING PSYCHOL. 261, 264-65 (1965).
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as psychology or medicine are required to make difficult diagnoses or
predictions, they are better off in the long run relying on statistical
information about a few key variables than on their own all-things-
considered clinical judgments about the particular case. 18 6 One
study, for instance, showed that the application of a statistically
derived personality test better distinguished between patients diag-
nosed as neurotic and psychotic, respectively, than did twenty-nine
subjects, including many Ph.Ds in psychology, who were provided with
all the same relevant data. 187 Such results appear to stem from both
experts' tendency to pay insufficient attention to base rates when mak-
ing predictive or diagnostic judgments, as well as their inability to
accord proper weight to the variables they consider.'88 In fact, some
researchers have suggested that experts are usually quite adept at
identifying which variables are relevant to making accurate predictions
or diagnoses; the problem is that they tend to misallocate the relevant
weights of such variables. 189 And they do so to such an extent that they
would be even better off combining them in quite crude ways, such as
by assigning each variable the same weight.190
From this body of empirical research, three generalizations
emerge. First, people tend not to appreciate sufficiently the signifi-
cance of an indicator's relative weight or reliability when reconciling
conflicting evidence. Second, where the weight of a piece of evidence
is relatively low, people place undue confidence in its probative value,
and this is true even when they recognize that the weight is low.
Finally, accuracy in making predictive or diagnostic judgments may
often be improved by applying fixed weights to statistically relevant
evidence, rather than by attempting to determine individually the
appropriate weight in each case.
186 The classic work in this area is PAUL E. MEEHL, CLINICAL VERSUS STATISTICAL
PREDIcION (1954).
187 See Robyn M. Dawes et al., Clinical Versus ActuarialJudgment, 243 SCIENCE 1668,
1669 (1989).
188 See id. at 1672; Paul E. Meehl, Causes and Effects of My Disturbing Little Book, 50 J.
PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 370, 372 (1986).
189 See Dawes et al., supra note 187, at 1672; see also Robyn M. Dawes, The Robust
Beauty of Improper Linear Models in Decision Making, 34 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 571 (1979),
reprinted inJUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 175, at 391, 395 ("People are
good at picking out the right predictor variables and at coding them in such a way
that they have a conditionally monotone relationship with the criterion. People are
bad at integrating information from diverse and incomparable sources.").
190 See Dawes et al., supra note 187, at 1672.
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b. Application to Evidence Law
Whether such generalizations may validly be applied to judges
and juries is a difficult and controversial question. Recently, scholars
have criticized not only the normative and methodological premises
on which the heuristics and biases research program is based, but also
the assumption that its findings apply uniformly across social and insti-
tutional contexts and thus unproblematicallyjustify proposals for legal
reform. 191 Such caution is well taken. Still, even if these biases are
not as strong or as pervasive as the research suggests, they at least sug-
gest that a type of rule that attempts to suppress the probative value of
testimony might be a useful complement to our factfinding methods.
As noted above, such rules vary both in the extent to which they bind
finders of fact and in their scope of application.' 92 How broad and
how binding any particular rule should be depends on the context,
but there is reason to think that using some form of such a rule could
increase the rate of accurate verdicts in the long run.
They would do so in two ways. First, rules of weight might
improve accuracy by decreasing the weight ascribed to already admis-
sible evidence. The clearest and most obvious example here is eyewit-
ness identifications. It is now widely understood by courts and
scholars that eyewitness identifications based on police lineups are far
less reliable than our commonsense intuitions might otherwise con-
sider them.' 93 Whether allowing psychological experts to testify on
191 See generally Gerd Gigerenzer & Peter M. Todd, Fast and Frugal Heuristics: The
Adaptive Toolbox, in SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE Us SMART 3, 5 (Gerd Gigerenzer et
al. eds., 1999) (applying the concept of first and frugal heuristics to decisionmaking
limited by time and knowledge); Jonathan J. Koehler, The Base Rate Fallacy Reconsid-
ered: Normative, Descriptive and Methodological Challenges, 19 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. J. 1, 1
(1996) (criticizing the current approach for "its failure to consider how the ambigu-
ous, unreliable, and unstable base rules of the real world are and should be used");
Mitchell, supra note 15, at 143-44 (arguing that the heuristics and biases research is
not as broadly applicable to factfinding as some have claimed).
192 See supra Part I.B.
193 The problems with eyewitness testimony have long been recognized. Nearly
one hundred years ago, the Harvard psychologist Hugo Munsterberg conducted a
number of studies on human perceptual abilities and published a book highly critical
of the law's apparent complacent attitude to the defects of eyewitness testimony. See
HUGO MUNSTERBERG, ON THE WITNESS STAND 10-11 (1908). The classic modern
account is ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1979). "The problem can be
stated rather simply: on the one hand, eyewitness testimony is very believable and can
wield considerable influence over the decisions reached by ajury; on the other hand,
eyewitness testimony is not always reliable." Id. at 6-7. For a useful collection of some
of the most important psychological research on the topic since then, see 2 THE
HANDBOOK OF EYEWITNESS PSYCHOLOGY (R.C.L. Lindsay et al. eds., 2007) and ELIZA-
BETH F. LOFTUS ET AL., EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CFVIL AND CRIMINAL (4th ed. 2007).
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the unreliability of eyewitness identifications is an effective and appro-
priate cure for this problem is still a subject of some debate. 194
Regardless, another approach would be to admit such identifications,
or a particular subclass of them that have proven to be particularly
unreliable, as a lower grade of evidence or one that cannot sustain
conviction without further corroboration.
Second, if we used rules of weight, we could allow more relevant
evidence in. Consider hearsay testimony. Most judges and scholars
recognize that hearsay evidence is relevant and thus has some proba-
tive value; however, it is excluded on the ground that juries might
accord it more weight than it deserves. 195 If, for instance, all hearsay
evidence were admitted as a low grade of evidence-or one that is less
reliable than any direct evidence that directly contradicted it-then it
may be that the true probative value of hearsay evidence would be
better accounted for in the long run than it is in the current system of
exclusion and exceptions. 196 A jury could be instructed accordingly:
"Xs testimony about Y is hearsay. The law considers such testimony
to be generally of questionable reliability. As such, you ought not
accord that statement much weight in your deliberations."
Of course, one might immediately register skepticism as to the
capacity of juries to apply such rules. Much research conducted over
the last thirty years, for instance, suggests that jury instructions on the
substantive law, the burden of proof, and the rules of evidence are
rarely effective at guiding jury decisionmaking. 197 There may be little
reason to think that jurors would be much better at applying rules of
weight. Indeed, the research on capital punishment instructions,
which ask juries to "weigh" mitigating factors against aggravating fac-
tors, offers a bleak assessment of the jury's capacity to follow what
194 See, e.g., Steven D. Penrod & Brian Cutler, Preventing Mistaken Convictions in
Eyewitness Identification Trials: The Case Against Traditional Safeguards, in PSYCHOLOGY
AND LAW 89, 112-15 (Ronald Ruesch et al. eds., 1999) (endorsing the use of such
experts in trials).
195 See Kenneth Culp Davis, Hearsay in Administrative Hearings, 32 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 689, 689-90, 695-96 (1964) (noting that just like nonhearsay evidence, "the reli-
ability of hearsay ranges from the least to the most reliable" and that "[a]ll evidence
scholars, without exception, express dissatisfaction with the hearsay rule").
196 Of course, admission of hearsay testimony in the criminal context might vio-
late the Confrontation Clause. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004)
(holding that prior opportunity to cross-examine a witness is required by the Sixth
Amendment's Confrontation Clause).
197 For a useful overview of this literature, see Joel D. Lieberman & Bruce D. Sales,




appear to be a quite similar type of instruction to that required for
rules of weight. 198
But the research on jury instructions does not prove that juries
are incapable of applying rules of weight, because that research also
suggests that the problem with instructions is not that the concepts
employed are too conceptually complex for the average juror to han-
dle, but rather that the language used is too legalistic and arcane. 99
One study on death penalty instructions, for instance, found that com-
prehension of instructions was extremely low not because jurors did
not know how to "weigh" factors but because they did not understand
what the terms "mitigating" and "aggravating" meant in the first
place.200 And this finding is consistent with the experience of many
courts in which juries have asked for explanations as to the meaning
of such terms.20 1 Perhaps not surprisingly, researchers have found
that they can improve comprehension of all sorts of jury instructions
by replacing legal jargon with simpler language and more straightfor-
ward syntax. 20 2 It thus seems reasonable to infer that so long as
instructions for rules of weight are written in straightforward, plain
language such as that suggested above, jurors will be able to under-
stand them and therefore apply them.
Now one might question whether this last inference is always war-
ranted. Some tasks asked of jurors may simply be too psychologically
difficult for them to follow, even if the instructions are clearly written
198 See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror lnstruc-
tions in Capital Cases, 79 CORNELL L. Ruv. 1, 9-12 (1993) (suggesting that jurors have
difficulty understanding the burden of proof and weighing evidence during the pen-
alty phase of capital trials); Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, Comprehending Life and Death
Matters: A Preliminary Study of California's Capital Penalty Instructions, 18 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 411, 425 (1994) (same).
199 See Nancy S. Marder, BringingJury Instructions into the Twenty-First Century, 81
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 449, 454 (2006) (reviewing three decades of empirical literature
on jury instructions and concluding that "[r]esearchers have found that jurors are
confused because the instructions use legal jargon or ambiguous language, awkward
grammatical constructions, and an organization that is difficult to discern").
200 Haney & Lynch, supra note 198, at 420-21.
201 See Peter Meijes Tiersma, Dictionaries and Death: Do Capital Jurors Understand
Mitigation?, 1995 UTAH L. REv. 1, 11-23 (discussing several cases where juries have
asked courts for clarifying definitions of "mitigating" or "aggravating" circumstances).
202 See Robert P. Charrow & Veda R. Charrow, Making Legal Language Understanda-
ble: A Psycholinguistic Study of Jury Instructions, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1306, 1331 (1979)
(finding that juror comprehension improved thirty-five to forty percent after rewrit-
ing instructions in more simple and direct language); see also AMiRAM ELWORK ET AL.,
MAKING JURY INSTRUCTIONS UNDERSTANDABLE 145-81 (1982) (giving guidelines for
rewriting jury instructions).
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and the jurors well intentioned. 20 3  Such may be the case with so-
called "limiting instructions," which tell the jury to consider certain
pieces of evidence for one purpose but not another.20 4 For some
research suggests that judges are not much better at ignoring such
evidence than are jurors. 20 5  Perhaps, then, asking jurors to apply
rules of weight, like asking them to ignore evidence for certain pur-
poses, violates the principle of "ought implies can," according to
which "one can be obliged to do A only if one has an effective choice
as to whether to do A."'206
203 See Shari Seidman Diamond, Beyond Fantasy and Nightmare: A Portrait of the Juy,
54 BUFF. L. REV. 717, 751 (2006) (noting that certain limiting instructions, such as
those allowing that a defendant's criminal record be considered for impeachment
purposes but not as evidence of bad character, "may ask the jurors to engage in
mental gymnastics that are not easy to perform" and that 'jurors may be unwilling or
find it impossible to perform the required cognitive adjustments").
204 There has been much research on the effectiveness (or lack thereof) of limit-
ing instructions. See, e.g.,Joel D. Lieberman &Jamie Arndt, Understanding the Limits of
Limiting Instructions: Social Psychological Explanations for the Failures of Instructions to Disre-
gard Pretrial Publicity and Other Inadmissible Evidence, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 677,
686 (2000) (noting several studies that show that jurors are influenced by evidence of
a defendant's prior conviction even when told to disregard it for purposes other than
credibility); Roselle L. Wissler & Michael J. Saks, On the Inefficacy of Limiting Instruc-
tions: Whe Jurors Use Prior Conviction Evidence to Decide on Guilt, 9 LAw & HUM. BEHAV.
37, 47 (1985) (concluding that "the presentation of the defendant's criminal record
does not affect the defendant's credibility, but does increase the likelihood of convic-
tion, and that the judge's limiting instructions do not appear to correct that error").
In fact, some studies have suggested that such instructions produce a "backfire effect,"
whereby the instruction calls attention to the relevant piece of evidence and makes
the jury more likely to consider it. See Lieberman & Arndt, supra, at 689 (noting the
backfire effect and citing a 1959 study showing that "participants awarded higher
damages to a plaintiff after being instructed by ajudge to disregard a statement that a
defendant was covered by insurance than when given no instructions to that effect"
(citing Dale W. Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REV. 744,
744-60 (1959))). But see Mitchell, supra note 15, at 1121 (noting that recent studies
suggest that jury deliberations may increase the capacity ofjurors to ignore inadmissi-
ble evidence).
205 See Wistrich et al., supra note 15, at 1259 (concluding that their study showed
that "some types of highly relevant, but inadmissible, evidence influenced the judges'
decisions").
206 William P. Alston, The Deontological Conception ofEpistemicJustification, in 2 PHIL
OSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES: EPISTEMOLOGY 257, 259 (1988). The application of this prin-
ciple to the law of evidence is hardly new. Two centuries ago, James Wilson explained
why rules of admissibility are preferable to rules of weight on precisely this ground:
The law will not order that which is unnecessary: it will not attempt that
which is impracticable. In no case, therefore, does it order a witness to be
believed; for jurors are triers of the credibility of witnesses, as well as of the
truth of facts .... In no case, likewise, does the law order a witness not to be
believed; for belief might be the unavoidable result of his testimony.
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The question is ultimately an empirical one, but it seems plausi-
ble to think that applying a defeasible rule of weight does not present
nearly as formidable a psychological challenge as does applying a con-
ventional limiting instruction. This is so because, as an intuitive mat-
ter, it seems far more difficult to ignore a factor completely than
merely to accord it reduced significance in making a decision. To see
why this might be, consider the following scenario: you have just been
offered a greatjob at a start-up company, e-widgets.com, that makes e-
widgets. You are excited about the opportunity, because your offer
includes a lot of stock options at an attractive (but hopefully not
backdated) strike price, and there is much industry buzz about the
company. Still, you are undecided because you recognize that there is
some risk that the company will not survive. So you discuss the matter
over lunch with your friend Alfred (whom you know) and Alfred's
new friend Bob (whom you've never met). Bob advises you against
taking the job because he has heard horrible things about the e-wid-
gets.com management team-that they are incompetent, deceitful,
and egomaniacal. As Bob then recounts various stories of perfidy and
incompetence, you begin to think you better stay with your current
job. But the day after your lunch, Alfred calls you and tells you that
Bob works for a direct competitor of e-widgets.com and that although
he does not know Bob himself well, he would take what anyone at his
company says about e-widgets.com with a grain of salt.
Now consider two questions: (1) Are you able to do as Alfred sug-
gests and discount the information Bob gave you accordingly? (2) If
Alfred had instead told you to ignore what Bob said completely for the
purposes of your job offer but to consider it for the purpose of, say,
making an investment in the company, would you be able to do that?
If the answer to (1) is yes, then you can successfully apply a rule of
weight. And if the answer to (2) is no, then applying rules of weight
seems to present a quite different psychological task than following
limiting instructions.
2. Fairness and Risk Allocation
That the law should treat people equally is a bedrock legal princi-
ple, and the capacity of rules to ensure such equal treatment is consid-
ered to be one of their chief virtues.20 7  Rules deprive the
James Wilson, Of the Nature and Philosophy of Evidence, in 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES
WILSON 369, 383 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967).
207 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv.
1175, 1178 (1989) ("The Equal Protection Clause epitomizes justice more than any
other provision of the Constitution. And the trouble with the discretion-conferring
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decisionmaker of a type of decisional jurisdiction and, in so doing,
make decisions more consistent and predictable. 208 This feature of
rules remains a virtue in procedural and evidentiary matters.209
Indeed, Professor Alex Stein has recently argued that allocating the
risk of factfinding error is one of the central goals of evidence law. 210
According to Stein, evidence rules not only serve to ensure that civil
parties bear the risk of error equally but also apportion risk according
to substantive moral and political principles. 211 The most obvious
example, of course, is the heightened burden of proof in criminal
trials, but Stein also argues that rules excluding hearsay and character
evidence can be justified on comparable grounds.212
Rules of weight, however, are even more effective than rules of
admissibility at ensuring consistency in factfinding. By specifying in
advance the amount of weight certain types of testimony or evidence
deserve, rules of weight prevent judges or juries from willfully or mis-
takenly disregarding or overvaluing evidence. Indeed, this has long
been considered a chief virtue of such rules. In his 1838 treatise on
circumstantial evidence, William Wills explained that the Roman law
system of "half-proofs" served as an "important limitation[] upon the
tyranny and inconstancy of judicial discretion," particularly given that
in those times "laws were administered by a single judge, without the
salutary restraints of publicity and popular observation." 213 For the
same reason, scholars have criticized Bentham's "natural system" of
free proof precisely on the ground that it entails placing undue faith
in the fairness and competence of officials.214
Rules of weight serve the interests of fairness in another, related
way as well. Because substantive rights are always at issue in any adju-
dication and because no factfinding procedure can be guaranteed to
approach to judicial law making is that it does not satisfy this sense of justice very
well.").
208 See SCHAUER, supra note 133, at 158.
209 See STEIN, supra note 9, at 183-208 (arguing that the use of exclusionary rules
is necessary to allocate the risk of factfinding error between the parties in legitimate
ways); L. Jonathan Cohen, Freedom of Proof in FACTS IN LAW 1, 2-5 (William Twining
ed., 1983) (presenting, though ultimately rejecting, a rule-of-law argument in favor of
regulating proof).
210 See STEIN, supra note 9, at 1.
211 See id. at 172-78, 214-19.
212 See id. at 183-98. Stein's justification for excluding such evidence requires
more explanation than can be provided here.
213 WILLS, supra note 23, at 34-35; see also DAMASKA, supra note 9, at 20 (noting
that most of the rules of weight and sufficiency used in criminal trials under the
Roman system served to protect criminal defendants from unwarranted conviction).
214 See TWINING, supra note 38, at 70.
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be free from error, any method of factfinding has the effect of allocat-
ing the risk of such error between the parties. 215 And proper alloca-
tion of such risk depends on moral or political criteria, not epistemic
ones.216 A system of factfinding, for instance, might allocate risk in
such a way as to minimize overall error costs without regard for who
pays such costs (i.e., bears the risk of error). Or it could allocate risk
according to moral criteria, such as a reluctance to expose innocent
individuals to the risk of unjust criminal punishment.217
Rules of weight can serve well this risk allocation function. The
best example of existent rules are corroboration rules (of the absolute
sort), which preclude a verdict against a criminal defendant based on
certain types of uncorroborated testimony.218 Of course, such rules
are partly motivated by accuracy concerns since, if there were no par-
ticular doubts about the reliability of the covered testimony, there
would be no need for a rule. But they also rest on a substantive moral
judgment that criminal defendants should not be forced to bear the
risk that the testimony may turn out to be false. 219 And this is not only
true of absolute corroboration rules, which directly result in judg-
ments as a matter of law. Defeasible rules of weight do not foreclose
the possibility of a verdict against the defendant based on certain evi-
dence, but they may lower the likelihood that a verdict will be based
on such evidence by calling the factfinder's attention to its weakness.
In other words, like corroboration rules, they are capable of allocating
the risk of factfinding errors in such a way as to reflect principles of
fairness.
One might object, however, that such rules of weight are not
meaningfully enforceable. Given that even simple cases may involve a
mass of conflicting and corroborating evidence, how can one possibly
tell whether ajudge orjury has accorded "low weight" to a given piece
of evidence pursuant to a rule or instruction? The answer to this
objection differs as between jury trials, on the one hand, and bench
trials or nontrial dispositions on the other. As used in jury trials, it is
true that whether the jury applied a rule of weight will sometimes be
difficult to tell, but two points deflate the force of this objection. First,
in those cases in which the rule matters the most it will probably be
the most clear. That is, if there is a great deal of evidence adduced in
support of a particular fact, whether or not the jury properly dis-
215 See STEIN, supra note 9, at 12-13.
216 See id.
217 See id.
218 See supra Part II.B.1.
219 See S'rI'N, supra note 9, at 208.
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counted one piece of evidence will be difficult to determine but not
terribly significant. On the other hand, if a factual conclusion rests
virtually entirely on a piece of evidence deemed unreliable or suspect,
a possible violation will likely be both more important and more
apparent. Furthermore, any evaluation of rules of weight must be
made relative to the status quo. Under current practices, the jury's
reasoning processes are already treated as a "black box," so it is virtu-
ally impossible to tell whether it even understood the applicable law
correctly.
One might respond that regardless of what the jurors actually do,
given the frequency with which objections are already made to a
court's jury instructions on the law, attempting to instruct them on
questions of fact will open up a procedural can of worms. Wigmore
made this argument, suggesting that rules of weight would introduce
"ten thousand more quibbles" into the system. 220 But while incorpo-
rating dozens of reliability rules may become unworkably complex,
there is no reason to think that the use of a few, simple ones would.
Indeed, this point is really about the complexity of jury instructions,
which likely applies with equal or greater force to instructions on
law.221
As applied to nonjury dispositions, rules of weight may actually
make it easier to enforce fair and accurate judicial findings of fact.
Insofar as rules of weight serve as sufficiency standards that determine
whether a case may go to trial or whether a verdict is supported by
sufficient evidence, they offer appellate courts substantive standards
by which to determine whether a court properly interpreted the evi-
dence before it. Rules of admissibility, on the other hand, offer no
comparable guidance. 222 One result may be that appellate courts
220 Wigmore, supra note 7, at 478. This argument may find some empirical sup-
port in the findings of the Law Commission of the English High Chancellor, which
recommended to Parliament in 1991 that it abolish a corroboration rule that applied
to the testimony of accomplices. Its report noted that "[t] he complexity of the corrobo-
ration rules is notorious, as are the very great difficulties that that complexity causes
both for the judges who have to expound the rules and for the juries who have to try
to understand and apply them." CORROBORATION OF EVIDENCE, supra note 27, at 4.
221 See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 184 (1936) ("These
instructions are like exorcising phrases intended to drive out evil spirits .... [T]he
more unintelligible and technical instructions on the law may be considered as part of
this mechanism of exorcism, resembling the 'tremendous words' from Hebrew and
Greek . . . which the medieval exorcists employed to scare away the minions of
Satan.").
222 See Mnookin, supra note 9, at 138 (noting that appellate review of a judge's
application of admissibility rules in bench trials is nearly impossible because "we
almost entirely lack formal rules about weight or probative value").
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would accord trial courts less deference on questions of fact than they
currently do. But while doing so may raise its own concerns, a lack of
enforceability would not likely be one of them.
3. Efficiency and Agency Adjudication
That rules reduce decision costs is also one of the classic justifica-
tions for a regime of rule-based decisionmaking. 223 Professor Kaplow
usefully distinguishes among several different types of costs associated
with any legal regime that will vary according to whether the legal
directives take the form of rules or standards. 224 The costs of promul-
gating a rule will be higher than those of promulgating a standard
because more information is required to specify the content of the
rule.22 5 But it costs less for individuals to comply with the law, and for
judges to enforce it, in rule-like regimes than it does in regimes gov-
erned by standards, all other things being equal.2 26 Furthermore, the
more frequent the conduct that the law governs is, the greater the
efficiency gains of a regime of rules will be.
2 27
One need not engage in an in-depth economic analysis of evi-
dence law to see how rules may serve efficiency goals in factfinding.228
Adjudicative factfinding is expensive for society, but inaccurate ver-
dicts in civil or criminal litigation result in real individual and social
costs. A plausible goal of an evidentiary regime is thus to minimize
223 See SCHAUER, supra note 133, at 146 ("[R]ules allocate the limited decisional
resources of individual decisionmakers, focusing their concentration on the presence
or absence of some facts and allowing them to 'relax' with respect to others."); Kath-
leen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARv. L. REv. 22, 73
(1992) ("[A]dherence to precedent increases judicial efficiency by eliminating the
duplicative work and the risk of error from incompetence or bias that would result
from starting each case anew from first principles."); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with
Rules, 83 CAL. L. REv. 953, 972 (1995) ("Rules make it unnecessary for each of us to
examine fundamental issues in every instance; in this way rules create a convergence
on particular outcomes by people who disagree on basic matters. Rules can, in short,
be the most efficient way to proceed, by saving time and effort, and by reducing the
risk of error in particular cases.").
224 See Kaplow, supra note 135, at 577.
225 See id.
226 See id. at 562-64, 577.
227 See id. at 586-96, 621 ("If conduct will be frequent, the additional costs of
designing rules-which are borne once-are likely to be exceeded by the savings real-
ized each time the rule is applied.").
228 For such a treatment arguing that American evidence law is more efficient and
cost effective than other evidentiary systems, see generally Richard A. Posner, An Eco-
nomic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477 (1999). For further discus-
sion of this topic examining a cost efficiency approach to evidence, see STEIN, supra
note 9, at 141-72. In this section, I draw primarily from these sources.
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the sum of these two costs, which requires searching for the truth
about disputed factual issues up to the point where the cost of secur-
ing a piece of evidence is equal to the reduction in error costs that the
production of such evidence entails.2 29 Evidence rules may serve this
goal either directly or instrumentally. So, for instance, the hearsay
rule may represent a straightforward judgment that the reduction in
error costs that hearsay evidence may yield does not, on balance, out-
weigh the costs of evaluating such evidence in every case (and that the
opposite is true of evidence falling under hearsay exceptions) .230
Some rules may also reduce error costs indirectly by forcing parties to
produce the best evidence within their control. 23 1 Many burden-shift-
ing legal presumptions serve this function, as did the original docu-
ments rule, which did not admit copies of documents unless the
original was unavailable. 23 2
Rules of weight also enable factfinding to be more efficient. Even
though, as stated, some such rules are more accurately characterized
as guidelines or standards, they still offer a more rule-like approach
than the current state of unconstrained discretion. Like admissibility
rules and other evidentiary devices, they could improve efficiency in
two ways, either directly or instrumentally. Most straightforwardly,
they often facilitate resolution of cases without the expense of a jury.
But even within ajury trial, rules of weight could reduce overall costs.
A rule that admits hearsay as a lower grade of evidence, for instance,
reduces error costs if such a rule more accurately describes the
amount of probative value the factfinder ought to attach to such evi-
dence. And while it would not reduce decision costs as much as an
exclusionary rule would, since the evidence would still need to be con-
sidered by the factfinder, it would reduce them more than no rule at
all because, given its second-class status, the opposing party would
devote fewer resources to disputing it and the factfinder would likely
spend less time considering its relative reliability.
Rules of weight are also instrumentally effective at reducing
errors and are thus consistent with the "best evidence principle,"
according to which the function of rules of evidence is to ensure that
parties produce the best evidence in their control. 23 3 Although
229 See Posner, supra note 228, at 1481.
230 See id. at 1530.
231 See STEIN, supra note 9, at 154; see also Nance, supra note 30, at 230-31 (provid-
ing the justification for a best evidence rule).
232 The original documents rule has been replaced in federal courts by FED. R.
EVID. 1002-1004. For the use of presumptions as burden-shifting devices, see gener-
ally Allen, supra note 108, at 332-38.
233 See Nance, supra note 30, at 271.
RULES OF WEIGHT
excluding evidence is clearly a more severe sanction than simply
assigning it low weight, the latter would still likely have some effect
and, once again, any increase in decision costs may be outweighed by
the reduction in error costs.
Of course, trying to calculate in advance how the social costs of
any procedural regime will ultimately net out is tricky business, not
least because one needs to account not only for the costs of the trial
and to the parties, but also for the incentive effects on future actors.
Professor Stein, for instance, has suggested that admitting hearsay evi-
dence might trigger ancillary litigation, which would produce addi-
tional costs. 23 4 If that is so, a rule of weight that merely depresses the
probative value of such evidence may not be sufficient to forestall such
costly behavior. But even if it is not possible to evaluate the relative
efficiency of a system of rules of weights in the abstract, it certainly is
possible to draw some conclusions about the procedural contexts in
which they would be most effective. Recall that the efficiency gains
will be greatest in a rule-based regime where the costs of promulgat-
ing the rule are low and the frequency of its application is likely to be
high. 235 Both of these factors suggest that rules of weight will be par-
ticularly appropriate when used by specialized tribunals that can lever-
age their expertise to develop and implement such rules to deal with
frequently recurring factual circumstances.
No surprise, then, that currently rules of weight are most com-
monly used by administrative agencies. As discussed in Part I, many
agencies have employed rules of weight that deem certain types of
testimony to be unreliable or less reliable than other sources of testi-
mony. The United States International Trade Commission, to cite just
one example, has held that the testimony of the employees of an
owner of an alleged trademark is not accorded much weight. 236 Not
only do agencies derive clear efficiency gains given the relatively low
cost of promulgating such rules and the high frequency of their appli-
cation, but the other benefits of rules of weight also apply with partic-
ularly strong force. The accuracy of the rules is likely heightened by
an agency's relative expertise over matters within its jurisdiction.
Equally important, because Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) do not
enjoy the salary protections that federal judges do, their discretion
may be that much more in need of checking to ensure that parties
234 See STEIN, supra note 9, at 156.
235 See Kaplow, supra note 135, at 564, 577.
236 See, e.g., Certain Braiding Machs., USITC Pub. 1435, Inv. No. 337-TA-130
(Oct. 1983) ("Generally speaking, little weight is accorded to the testimony of an
employee of the owner of the alleged trademark because of the potential risk that the
perceptions conveyed are colored by bias."). For other examples, see supra Part I.D.2.
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receive fair and equal adjudication of their claims. 237 The wildly dis-
parate treatment of asylum applicants by immigration judges that has
recently received national attention is just one particularly egregious
example. 238  Indeed, if bureaucrats display systematic prejudices
against certain types of claims, better that such prejudgments be for-
mulated as rules so that they can be reviewed by agencies and appel-
late courts. 23 9
Indeed, for all these reasons, the use of rules of weight by agen-
cies may teach a lesson applicable to judicial proceedings, for they
demonstrate how such rules may preserve a system of relatively free
proof by offering a less extreme form of regulating factfinding than
through the adoption of exclusionary rules. Because agencies typi-
cally do not make extensive use of rules of admissibility, agency adju-
dication has often been held up as a model of a freer system of
proof.240 But it may be that rules of weight are necessary to maintain
such a system without granting judges unfettered discretion over
factfinding.
At this point one might object that the administrative experience
is the exception that proves the rule. Since administrative agencies
have never been held to the same procedural standards as have civil
and criminal courts of law, a defense of rules of weight in that context
hardly advances the cause. However, the Supreme Court has sug-
gested that, even when used by agencies, rules of weight may be not
just ineffective, but unconstitutional.
237 Compare 5 U.S.C. § 5372 (2000) (detailing the pay scale of administrative law
judges statutorily determined by the executive office of personnel management), with
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The [Federal] Judges .. . shall, at stated times, receive for
their Services a Compensation which shall not be diminished during their Continu-
ance in Office.").
238 SeeJulia Preston, Big Disparities Found in Judging of Asylum Cases, N.Y. TIMES, May
31, 2007, at Al. For the massive, several-year study on which this Article is based,
documenting the enormous disparities in the rates with which immigration judges
grant asylum to applicants, see Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in
Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 310-49 (2007).
239 Criticism of immigration judges has been severe recently in this regard. See,
e.g., Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 830 (7th Cir. 2005) (collecting cases in
which circuit courts have criticized immigration judges and the Board of Immigration
Appeals in asylum cases and noting that "adjudication of these cases at the administra-
tive level has fallen below the minimum standards of legal justice").
240 See, e.g., Davis, supra note 13, at 586-91 (outlining the contours and advantages
of evidentiary procedures in administrative courts).
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III. A DEEPER CHALLENGE: ALLENTOWN MACK V. NLRB
In Allentown Mack, the Supreme Court condemned the use of
rules of weight as inconsistent with fundamental notions of due pro-
cess. 24 ' The Court's opinion is not entirely clear and lends itself to a
couple of different interpretations, suggesting both epistemic objec-
tions to rules of weight, as well as moral ones. But neither sort of
objection is sufficient to justify the Court's blanket denunciation of
rules of weight.
At issue in Allentown Mack were two closely related rules that the
National Labor Relations Board used to rely on when adjudicating
collective bargaining disputes. Under federal law, companies have a
duty to bargain collectively with the union representing their employ-
ees.2 42 Whenever a company's ownership changes, the law presumes
that the union continues to enjoy majority support of the employees,
but the company can overcome that presumption if it has a "good
faith reasonable doubt" about such majority support.243 In evaluating
the evidence as to whether an employer does in fact have such good
faith reasonable doubt, the NLRB used to cite cases in support of the
propositions that (1) one employee's testimony conveying the views of
other employees ought not be accorded much weight;244 and (2) that
any statement related to union support made by an employee in the
context of an interview with the new employer was not particularly
reliable. 245  For years, federal courts reviewing such decisions
241 Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 368-71 (1998).
242 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (2000).
243 Eg., Pioneer Inn Assocs. v. NLRB, 578 F.2d 835, 839 (1978).
244 See Deutsch, 293 N.L.R.B. 1000, 1001 n.ll (1989) ("The Board has stated that
'testimony concerning conversation directly with the employees involved ... is much
more reliable than testimony concerning merely a few employees ostensibly convey-
ing the sentiments of their fellows.'" (alteration in original) (quoting Sofco, Inc., 268
N.L.R.B. 159, 160 n.10 (1983))); La.-Pac. Corp., 283 N.L.R.B. 1079, 1080 n.6 (1987)
("With respect to the statement of employee Harker purporting to represent the views
of other employees, we find that little weight can be accorded to such a statement.");
Sofco, 268 N.L.R.B. at 160 n.10 ("[T]estimony concerning conversations directly with
the employees involved, as here, is much more reliable than testimony concerning
merely a few employees ostensibly conveying the sentiments of their fellows.").
245 See Middleboro Fire Apparatus, Inc., 234 N.L.R.B. 888, 894 (1978) ("State-
ments made by employees during the course of an interview with a prospective
employer that they approve of his unqualified position that he has no contract and is
not obligated to bargain with the Union claiming to represent them are not volun-
tary, uncoerced expressions of employee sentiment upon which their employer can
rely in asserting a good-faith doubt of an incumbent union's majority status.").
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endorsed such rules or deferred to the NLRB's judgment as to their
utility.
2 4 6
In Allentown Mack, however, the Supreme Court stripped these
rules of any independent legal force and, possibly, found them uncon-
stitutional. 247 The Court vacated the NLRB's judgment in which the
Board had found that Allentown Mack did not have a reasonable
good faith doubt that the union representing its employees did not
enjoy majority support.248 Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia noted
that several pieces of evidence supported Allentown Mack's good faith
doubt about the union's support, but he found particularly significant
one employee's statement that "'the entire night shift did not want
the Union"' and another's that "'it was his feeling that the employees
did not want a Union.' ' '2 49 The Court thus concluded that the
NLRB's decision was not supported by substantial evidence and so
reversed the D.C. Circuit's judgment in its favor.2 50
Administrative law scholars tend to see Allentown Mack as signifi-
cant insofar as it reflects the Court's more rigorous review of agency
factual findings and thus its departure from previous understandings
of "substantial evidence" review. 25I But the Court seemed as troubled
by how the NLRB found the facts in the case as it did by the fact that
the Board got them wrong. Specifically, the Court objected to the
246 See, e.g., Bryan Mem'l Hosp. v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 1259, 1262 (8th Cir. 1987)
("Unverified claims by employees that they speak for others is not a sufficient basis for
an employer's reasonable good faith doubt about union support where there are no
other reliable indicia of employee attitudes."); NLRB v. Middleboro Fire Apparatus,
Inc., 590 F.2d 4, 9 (1st Cir. 1978) (deferring to the NLRB's "seasoned feel for the
meaning of events in a labor-management setting" including its judgment on such
factual issues as whether "the factors of a few employees dealing with a prospective
employer in a close relationship and informal surroundings were likely to mean more
or less coercion"); NLRB v. Cornell of Cal., Inc., 577 F.2d 513, 516-17 (9th Cir. 1978)
(approving of the NLRB's rule according little weight to employee assertions about
the views of other employees on the ground that it "avoids allowing a few employees
to undermine their union merely by making an assertion that is not easily verified by
the employer" and concluding that "an employer cannot satisfy its burden of proof
that the doubts were reasonable by resting exclusively on such normally unreliable
assertions" (citation omitted)).
247 Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 370 (1998).
248 See id. at 380.
249 Id. at 369-70 (quoting employee statements).
250 See id. at 380.
251 See, e.g., 2 RICHARDJ. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 11.2, at 775
(4th ed. 2002) ("The majority opinion is extraordinary in terms of its degree of depar-
ture from the Court's traditional approach to the substantial evidence test."); M. Eliz-
abeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REx'. 1383, 1429 n.152
(2004) ("Some scholars point to the recent case of [Allentown Mack] as illustrative of a
new era of intense examination of agency factfinding." (citation omitted)).
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NLRB's reliance on the rules relating to testimonial weight men-
tioned above. 252 It noted, for instance, that it was error for the ALJ to
discount one employee's statements on the basis of "'the Board's his-
torical treatment of unverified assertions by an employee about
another employee's sentiments.' "253 Whether or not the Board
treated such statements in this way, they "provide no justification for
the Board's factual inferences here. ' 254 According to the Court, such
inferences depend exclusively on "logic and sound inference from all
the circumstances, not an arbitrary rule of disregard to be extracted
from prior Board decisions."255 While recognizing that the Board
could adopt exclusionary rules of evidence or even "forthrightly and
explicitly adopt counterfactual evidentiary presumptions (which are
in effect substantive rules of law) as a way of furthering particular legal
or policy goals," it considered such rules very different from the rules
of weight used by the NLRB:
That is not the sort of Board action at issue here, however, but
rather the Board's allegedly systematic undervaluation of certain evi-
dence. . . . When the Board purports to be engaged in simple
factfinding, unconstrained by substantive presumptions or eviden-
tiary rules of exclusion, it is not free to prescribe what inferences
from the evidence it will accept and reject, but must draw all those
inferences that the evidence fairly demands. "Substantial evidence"
review exists precisely to ensure that the Board achieves minimal
compliance with this obligation, which is the foundation of all honest
and legitimate adjudication.2 56
In other words, the Court seemed to be saying, fair adjudication of
disputes requires drawing factual inferences entirely unencumbered
252 Allentown Mack, 522 U.S. at 378 (examining "the Board's allegedly systematic
undervaluation of certain evidence").
253 Id. at 379 (quoting Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc., 316 N.L.R.B. 1199, 1208
(1995)).
254 Id.
255 Id. at 378.
256 Id. at 378-79 (emphases added). Justice Breyer, writing in dissent, found noth-
ing wrong with the NLRB "drawing upon both reason and experience," to interpret
the evidence and in effect saying that "it will 'view with suspicion and caution' one
employee's statements 'purporting to represent the views of other employees.'" Id. at
393 (Breyer,J., dissenting) (quoting Wallkill Valley Gen. Hosp., 288 N.L.R.B. 103, 109
(1988)). Breyer thus asked rhetorically, "How is it unreasonable for the Board to
provide this kind of guidance, about what kinds of evidence are more likely, and what
kinds are less likely, to support an 'objective reasonable doubt' . ..?" Id. at 394. In
his view, it was perfectly proper for the NLRB to "develop rules of thumb about the
likely weight assigned to different kinds of evidence." Id. at 393.
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by rules of law and thus precludes the use of rules of weight. 257 But
there are two different rationales that could justify the Court's posi-
tion. Let us consider each in turn.
A. Epistemic Rationale
Some of the Court's language suggests that its objection is prima-
rily an epistemic one; that is, a concern with verdict accuracy. It notes,
for instance, that whatever validity the NLRB's rules may have as a
general matter, "they ... provide no justification for the Board's fac-
tual inferences here."258 Instead, the ALJ must use "logic and sound
inference from all the circumstances" to reach a conclusion. 259 This
view finds support in a theory of factfinding that has been dubbed
"evidentiary holism," 260 "relative plausibility theory," 2 6 1 or "coher-
ence" theory, 262 according to which factfinders do not and should not
assign each piece of evidence a precise probative value reducible to a
Bayesian conditional probability estimate. 263 Instead, they ought to
257 It is possible to read the Court as demanding only the publicity of procedural
rules-a traditional rule-of-law virtue. SeeJack Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Response:
The New International Law Scholarship, 34 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 463, 480 (2006) (list-
ing publicity as one of the "standard elements of the domestic rule of law" along with
"generality, stability, impartiality .... [and] equality before the law"). On this view,
the evil of the NLRB's policy was not that it prescribed a rule of weight but that it did
so secretively or without sufficient notice. But that reading seems impossible to
square with the NLRB's frequent and explicit statements of its policy that it would
view with skepticism certain statements made by employees, which it would support
with case citations. Such precedent surely suffices as notice under any plausible
understanding of what the rule of law demands. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808,
848 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stressing that overruling the Court's precedent
"ought to be a matter of great moment [because] fidelity to precedent is fundamental
to 'a society governed by the rule of law'" (citation omitted) (quoting Akron v. Akron
Center for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 420 (1983))).
258 Allentown Mack, 522 U.S. at 379.
259 Id.
260 Michael S. Pardo, Comment, Juridical Proof Evidence, and Pragmatic Meaning:
Toward Evidentiary Holism, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 399, 399 (2000).
261 Ronald J. Allen & Brian Leiter, Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence,
87 VA. L. REV. 1491, 1527-37 (2001).
262 Amalia Amaya, Reasoning About Facts in Law: Essays in Coherence, Evidence,
and Proof 66-70 (May 2007) (unpublished S.J.D. dissertation, Harvard Law School)
(on file with Harvard Law School Library).
263 See Pardo, supra note 260, at 401 ("A holistic theory of evidence posits that the
meaning or value of any particular atom of evidence depends on the role it plays in
relation to all other evidence available to an interpreter."). This theory has its philo-
sophical analogue in the view known as coherentism. See, e.g., LAURENCE BONJOUR &
ERNEST SOSA, EPISTEMICJUSrIFICATION 42 (2003) (defining a coherence theory ofjusti-
fication as "a view according to which (1) there are no basic or foundational beliefs
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assess it by reference to the overall plausibility of the evidence
presented at trial. 264 If evidentiary holism is correct, it may be argued,
then rules of weight such as the NLRB's would disrupt artificially the
otherwise natural process of holistically drawing inferences among
and between the various other items of evidence at trial in which
factfinders can and ought to engage. Inaccurate verdicts will result.
This objection is not persuasive against rules of weight. First,
even ifjurors (and perhapsjudges) do, as an empirical matter, tend to
reason holistically about evidence, there is some reason to doubt that
doing so is good for accurate factfinding.265 More important, even if
evidentiary holism is true as a normative matter, it does not under-
mine rules of weight because such rules would simply be incorporated
into the holistic analysis.
An analogy to statutory interpretation makes this point clear.
Even those who agree that the goal of interpreting statutes is to dis-
cern legislative intent may disagree about the most effective way to
meet that goal. Some believe thatjudges ought to look to all the rele-
vant evidence particular to the statute at hand as well as the structure
of the statute as a whole, while others remain skeptical of judges'
capacity to conduct such an inquiry and think the use of canons of
construction will better capture legislative intent in the long run.2 66
and (2) at least the primary basis for empirical justification is the fact that such beliefs
fit together and support each other in a variety of complicated ways, thus forming a
coherent system of beliefs-or perhaps more than one such system").
264 Supporters of the view that jurors ought to weigh evidence holistically have
found empirical support for the view that they do in fact reason in this way in the
work of Nancy Pennington and Reid Hastie. See, e.g., Allen & Leiter, supra note 261,
at 1528 n.110 (citing Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror
Decision Making: The Story Model 13 CARDozo L. REv. 519 (1991)).
265 In one study, for instance, Professor Dan Simon found that when subjects were
presented with a complicated and evenly balanced legal case involving a variety of
independent legal and factual issues, if a key fact was adjusted so that one party's
argument became much stronger than the other's, subjects' confidence in their own
initial judgments increased not only with respect to the relevant legal issue, but also
with respect to other legal issues on which the adjusted fact could have had no con-
ceivable relevance. See Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in
Legal Decision Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511, 538 (2004) (noting that new evidence
about a party's previous bad conduct appeared to affect subjects' confidence in their
judgments as to whether an Internet website was analogous to a newspaper for the
purposes of free speech doctrine).
266 See ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 4 (2006) ("[J]udges
should sharply limit their interpretive ambitions, in part by limiting themselves to a
small set of interpretive sources and a restricted range of relatively wooden decision-
rules."). Compare Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 2, at 351-52 (endorsing a model of
statutory interpretation captured by the metaphor of a "hermeneutical circle" accord-
ing to which, "[a] part can only be understood in the context of the whole, and the
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These two approaches are not in psychological tension with each other,
because even if words can only be understood contextually or holisti-
cally,2 67 this fact does not preclude the use of descriptive canons,
because such interpretive rules may themselves simply be included in
the holistic reading of the statute.
Of course, there is a tension between these two interpretive
approaches. But it is a substantive interpretive tension as to how Con-
gress operates. The less Congress considers canons of construction or
any general interpretive rules when drafting statutes and the more
uniquely drafted each legislative act is, the less likely it is that applying
such canons will yield accurate results and the better the holistic inter-
preter may be. But whether that is true depends on facts about Con-
gress, not about how people think or reason. To use the example in
Part II, Alfred's advice only presents a problem for the holistic rea-
soner to the extent that his generalization about the credibility of the
people who work at Bob's company (and, by logical implication, about
Bob's credibility) is mistaken.
Furthermore, a rule that suppresses the probative value of direct
evidence may very well aid the factfinder in reaching the truth of the
matter. As we have seen, some studies suggest that in drawing an
"inference to the best explanation" of a set of evidence, 268 people
tend not to consider adequately the unreliability of a source as a possi-
ble explanation for apparent evidentiary conflicts and inconsisten-
cies.269 Regardless, though, whether using rules to find facts increases
accuracy depends on facts about the world, not whether people rea-
son atomistically or holistically.
But perhaps that is just the point. Another version of the episte-
mic objection asserts that the world is simply too complicated, diverse
whole cannot be understood without analyzing its various parts," so that ajudge inter-
preting a statute ought to "consider it in light of the whole enterprise, including the
history, purpose, and current values" such that "none of the interpretive threads can
be viewed in isolation, and each will be evaluated in its relation to the other threads"),
with Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 349 (2005) (noting that
someone who agrees that the goal of statutory interpretation is to divine legislative
intent "could still be a textualist on the ground that judges are likely to make more
accurate assessments of legislative intent if they use a relatively rule-like approach").
267 PAUL GRiCE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS 222 (1989).
268 See Amaya, supra note 262, at 136 ("Coherence may be construed in the course
of legal decision-making through an 'inference to the best explanation.' That is,
coherence-based legal inference is at bottom an explanatory kind of inference.").
269 Cf Heller, supra note 15, at 244-45 (suggesting that the disproportionate
weight that jurors assign direct evidence relative to circumstantial evidence may be
due to the fact that jurors' unwillingness to convict depends on their ability to imag-
ine a scenario in which the defendant could be not guilty).
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and messy to ever allow us to fashion rules of weight adequately tai-
lored for their purpose.2 70 The proper response to this objection is to
acknowledge its force but note its limits. Certainly our ability to gen-
eralize accurately about the reliability of types of evidence is con-
strained by the limited reach of empirical methods. It may be
difficult, for instance, to determine with precision how reliable the
average person's memory of his or her childhood is, because it is not
always possible to confirm or deny alleged memories. But, as we saw
above, recent work in cognitive psychology suggests that even fairly
crude generalizations may nonetheless serve as reasonably reliable
predictors. 271 Thus, for instance, it may be that a rule of weight that
ascribes relatively low weight to cross-racial eyewitness identifications
or those based on certain types of police lineups, though over- and
underinclusive as any rule would be, might nevertheless more accu-
rately take account of the reliability of such evidence. In any case, all
such arguments depend on the particular rule of weight at hand. It is
not an objection to the very concept of rules of weight that they will be
difficult to fashion. Nor does it appear to be the problem in Allentown
Mack, for the Court suggested that the very idea of relying on rules
when finding facts warrants suspicion, not merely that the rules at
issue there were insufficiently precise. 272
270 ProfessorJennifer Mnookin, for instance, notes that a system of rules of weight
seems hard to imagine because "evidence evaluation is so particularized, so fact-inten-
sive, and so variable." See Mnookin, supra note 9, at 142-43. She thus rhetorically
asks, "What could such rules of weight possibly look like?" Id. at 143. Mnookin's
concern echoes that of both Bentham and Wigmore. See BENTHAM, supra note 41, at
180 ("To find infallible rules for evidence, rules which insure ajust decision, is, from
the nature of things, absolutely impossible."); see alsoJoHN HENRY WIGMORE, PRINCI-
PLES OF JUDICIAL PROOF 750 (1913) (noting that logic and psychology have "done
nothing practical towards a method for measuring the net effect of a series or mass of
mixed data bearing on a single alleged fact"). According to William Twining, for
Wigmore, "the main difficulty [of evaluating evidence] relate [d] to the complexity of
particular cases rather than to fundamental questions about epistemology or about
the kinds of logical processes involved." TWINING, supra note 38, at 125. Professor
Damagka argues that this view likely motivates the frequent criticisms of the Roman
system of proof: given how variable and context-dependent factfinding is, any attempt
to fashion rules suited to the purpose will inevitably result in "dangerous overgeneral-
izations." DAMASKA, supra note 9, at 21. Thus, under this view, Damaka explains, "To
legislate on a subject so deeply contextual is like legislating against a chameleon by
reference to its color." Id.
271 For instance, one study reported that whether a couple reported to be happily
married or not correlated very well to whether or not the formula "rate of love mak-
ing minus rate of arguments" had a positive value. See Dawes, supra note 189, at 393.
272 See Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 367-80 (1998).
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B. Moral Rationale
The Court may have been more concerned with procedural fair-
ness and political legitimacy than verdict accuracy. In noting, for
instance, that when engaged in "simple factfinding," the Board "is not
free to prescribe what inferences from the evidence it will accept and
reject,"273 the Court echoed Thayer's declaration that "[t] he law has
no mandamus to the logical faculty; it orders nobody to draw infer-
ences." 274 This view reflects perhaps the deepest and most common
objection to rules of weight, which condemns a factfinding process
governed by technical rules as excessively "mechanical. '" 275 Hence the
Court's disdain for the NLRB's "arbitrary rule of disregard. '276 But if
the worry is not the epistemic one that using overbroad rules will lead
to empirically incorrect verdicts, precisely wherein lies the problem?
There are a couple of possibilities. The first is that insofar as the
factfinder reaches factual conclusions out of legal obligation rather
than on the basis of her own reasoned judgments, such conclusions
are politically illegitimate. Like presumptions, rules of weight may
entail that the burden of proof is only reached "artificially" because
the factfinder does not truly believe the facts found.277 But note, first,
that in a deep sense this objection applies equally to the application of
substantive law. The rigid application of substantive rules of law may
often result in patently unjust consequences disconnected from their
apparent purposes.2 78 Whether such rules of law legitimately com-
mand obedience in spite of this disconnect depends on one's concep-
tion of legal authority. But at least under one well-established view,
obedience to legal authority is justified on the epistemic ground that
273 Id. at 378.
274 THAYER, supra note 50, at 313 n.1.
275 See, e.g., DAMASKA, supra note 9, at 19 (describing the criticism of the Roman
system of proof as a system of "mechanical regulation" that "turned the fact-finder
into a mere automaton compelled to come to a decision independently of his
beliefs").
276 Allentown Mack, 522 U.S. at 379.
277 Cf United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147 (1872) (striking down an
act of Congress, which required federal courts to deem presidential pardons to be
conclusive evidence of disloyalty to the Union, but barred courts from allowing such
pardons to be admitted in support of any claim against the United States, on the
ground that the Court was "forbidden to give the effect to evidence which, in its own
judgment, such evidence should have, and is directed to give it an effect precisely
contrary").
278 See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 606
(1908) ("Law has the practical function of adjusting every-day relations so as to meet
current ideas of fair play. It must not become so completely artificial that the public
is led to regard it as wholly arbitrary.").
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the authority is better able to balance the various reasons for action its
subjects already have. 279
The same is true of rules of weight; their justification rests on the
premise that the authority promulgating the rule-whether a court or
legislature-is better able to secure accurate verdicts by applying its
own generalizations about evidentiary reliability, rather than those of
the factfinder. 280 In other words, the law may legitimately serve as a
theoretical authority for the factfinder for the same reasons-and to
the same extent-as the substantive law may legitimately serve as a
practical authority for citizens.281 Of course, if it becomes clear that
their use results in systematically inaccurate verdicts, they would lose
their ability to justify compliance with them-just as a body of crimi-
nal law would fail to obligate its subjects to comply with it if it systemat-
ically resulted in the unjust infliction of punishment. But whether
that is true again depends not on the binding force of rules of weight
as such but on the empirical adequacy of the generalizations they
entrench.
Still, as a practical and doctrinal matter, the objection has some
force, at least in the criminal context where procedural rights are
most zealously protected. Indeed, for precisely these reasons, the
Supreme Court has struck down presumptions that make it easier for
prosecutors to convict defendants. 28 2 Even so, the objection only
applies to rules of weight that result in affirmatively finding facts
279 See JOSEPH RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 38-70 (1988) (articulating and
defending a "service" conception of authority); see also SCHAUER, supra note 133, at
126 & n.21 (suggesting that one justification for following rules may find support in
Raz's service conception of authority).
280 Cf Pound, supra note 278, at 605 ("Law is scientific in order to eliminate so far
as may be the personal equation in judicial administration, to preclude corruption
and to eliminate the dangerous possibilities of magisterial ignorance.... Being scien-
tific as a means toward an end, it must be judged by the results it achieves, not the
niceties of its internal structure .... .
281 Indeed, under another view, the two types of authority are virtually indistin-
guishable. Raz explains that under the "recognitional conception of authority," an
authority provides "reasons for belief" that there are reasons for acting in a certain
way, but does not itself provide the reasons for action: "practical authority is reinter-
preted as theoretical authority concerning belief in deontic propositions." See RAz,
supra note 279, at 29-30; cf. Donald H. Regan, Reasons, Authority, and the Meaning of
"Obey": Further Thoughts on Raz and Obedience to Law, 3 CANADIAN J.L. & JuRISPRUDENCE
3, 6 (1990) (arguing that authority provides only "indicative reasons" not "intrinsic
reasons" for action).
282 See supra note 108; see also Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 275 (1952)
("A presumption which would permit the jury to make an assumption which all the
evidence considered together does not logically establish would give to a proven fact
an artificial and fictional effect.").
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against the defendant, and such rules are neither common nor partic-
ularly desirable.283 Both the fairness and accuracy justifications for
rules of weight offered in Part II call for rules that suppress the proba-
tive value of certain types of evidence, not for ones that elevate it.
Indeed, rules that affirmatively demand that more weight be assigned
to a given piece of evidence than a factfinder might otherwise be
inclined to give it were not even common in the much-maligned
Roman system of proof.2 8 4
A second possibility is that the moral defect of rules of weight lies
not in their binding force but rather in their generality. Perhaps the
ALJ undermined the "foundation of all honest and legitimate adjudi-
cation"285 because he paid too much attention to the NLRB's institu-
tionally sanctioned background generalizations about testimonial
reliability, rather than "draw[ing] all those inferences that the evi-
dence fairly demand [ed]."286 Identifying precisely why relying on
generalizations in this way is unfair is surprisingly difficult, but the
dilemma lies at the center of the debates over the use of "naked statis-
tical evidence" and is usually revealed by hypothetical scenarios in
which a plaintiffs case depends almost entirely on general statistical
evidence, rather than evidence derived from the specific facts of his
case.287
283 The only example of such a rule that I have discovered is the "uncontradicted
testimony rule," according to which a jury is not permitted to ascribe zero weight to
the testimony of an uncontradicted, unimpeached witness. See sources cited supra
note 125.
284 See supra notes 20-24.
285 Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 379 (1998).
286 Id. at 378.
287 In the famous "Blue Bus" paradox, for instance, the only evidence as to who hit
the plaintiff's car on a dark night was that it was a blue bus and that eighty percent of
the buses in the town were operated by the defendant. See Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by
Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1329, 1340-41
(1971). The hypothetical was based on the real case of Smith v. Rapid Transit, 58
N.E.2d 754, 754-55 (Mass. 1945). In the Gatecrasher paradox, the owner of a rodeo
knows that 501 of 1000 spectators did not pay for admittance, so he picks one person
off the seats and sues him for failure to pay. See L. Jonathan Cohen, Subjective
Probability and the Paradox of the Gatecrasher, 1981 ARIz. ST. L.J. 627, 627. The issue in
both cases is whether such evidence is sufficient to find in the plaintiff's favor or even
get to ajury. For reviews of the literature describing the debates and noting that they
have "not yet run their course," see TWINING, supra note 8, at 74; William Twining &
Alex Stein, Introduction to EVIDENCE AND PROOF xxi-xxiv (William Twining & Alex
Stein eds., 1992) (previewing several essays on the subject). On the connection
between these paradoxes and the generality of rules, see FREDERICK SCHAUER,
PROFILES, PROBABILITIES AND STEREoThyPES 85 (2003), who notes that the Blue Bus and




Many people's intuition is that finding facts against a defendant
by reference to general categories rather than to the particular case-
specific facts seems somehow unjust, even if the categorical approach
produces more accurate verdicts in the long run.288 Assuming this
intuition is sound,28 9 the difficulty is how to explain orjustify it. The
most sophisticated effort to do just that can be found in Professor
Alex Stein's recent book.290 Stein argues that evidence law is and
ought to be as concerned with the fair allocation of the risk of
factfinding error as it is with reducing such errors.29 1 To this end, he
develops what he calls the "principle of maximal individualization"
(PMI), according to which (1) "fact-finders must receive and consider
all case-specific evidence pertaining to the case;" and (2) they "must
not make any finding against a litigant, unless the argument generat-
ing this finding and the evidence upon which this argument rests were
exposed to and survived maximal individualized examination. '" 292
Under this principle, because statistical evidence is not susceptible to
individualized testing, it cannot provide a legitimate basis for fair adju-
dicative factfinding. 29 3
288 See supra Part I.C.1.
289 This is by no means an uncontroversial assumption. Some scholars, for
instance, argue that the defendants in the naked statistics paradoxes ought properly
be held liable. See, e.g., SCHAUER, supra note 287, at 79-108; Koehler & Shaviro, supra
note 15, at 272-77. Advocates of this view tend to consider verdict accuracy to be the
primary, if not exclusive, goal of evidentiary and procedural law. See Shaviro, supra
note 15, at 535 (defending the use of naked statistical evidence on the ground that
"[t]rying to minimize the inevitable erroneous verdicts reflects a higher morality than
trying to ignore them").
290 See STEIN, supra note 9. Several others have criticized the use of naked statisti-
cal evidence as well. See L. JONATHAN COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE 120
(1977) ("[T]he advancement of truth in the long run is not necessarily the same
thing as the dispensation ofjustice in each individual case."); Lea Brilmayer & Lewis
Kornhauser, Review: Quantitative Methods and Legal Decisions, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 116,
149-50 (1978) (presenting, but questioning the adequacy of, an objection to the use
of statistics generally at trial on the ground that such evidence "denies litigants their
rights to be treated as individuals"); Laurence H. Tribe, An Ounce of Detention: Preven-
tive Justice in the World of John Mitchell, 56 VA. L. REV. 371, 387 (1970) ("[T]he very
enterprise of formulating a tolerable ratio of false convictions to false acquittals puts
an explicit price on an innocent man's liberty and defeats the concept of a human
person as an entity with claims that cannot be extinguished, however great the payoff
to society.").
291 See, e.g., STEIN, supra note 9, at x-xi ("[T]he key function of evidence law is to
apportion the risk of error in conditions of uncertainty, rather than facilitate the dis-
covery of the truth.").
292 Id. at 100 (emphasis omitted).
293 See id. at 85.
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Doing justice to Stein's impressive account of PMI requires more
space than permitted here, but doing so is not necessary because even
if we assume both that (1) there is an evidentiary norm that demands
individualized attention to case-specific evidence and that (2) rules of
weight such as those at issue in Allentown Mack potentially stand in
some tension with such a norm, such assumptions still do not justify
the Court's harsh condemnation of them, because some of the most
common exclusionary rules raise the same concerns. The Allentown
Mack Court emphasized that the Board could legitimately apply
"counterfactual evidentiary presumptions" and exclusionary rules for
policy reasons, so long as such rules were conceived "without reference
to [their] inherent probative value. '29 4 But in state and federal
courts, evidence is often excluded because of its low probative value.
The hearsay rule and its many exceptions, as we have seen, are best
understood as largely motivated by concerns about evidentiary relia-
bility. 295 So, too, are rules excluding whole classes of evidence, such
as polygraph tests. On what basis, then, may a court exclude such
evidence entirely but not merely accord it low weight?296 Insofar as
admissibility rules exclude evidence based on generalizations about
the reliability of evidence, such rules implicate the same fairness con-
cerns as do rules of weight.29 7
In short, none of the possible rationales for the Court's harsh
criticism of rules of weight are sufficient to defeat their use in toto. At
most, they suggest that certain types of rules may not be appropriate
in certain adjudicatory contexts. And to the extent generalizing in
factfinding is morally problematic, rules of weight fare no worse than
do rules of admissibility. In fact, as suggested above, it may be that
rules of weight could result in a system of relatively freer proof than
294 Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 378 (1998).
295 See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
296 Stein's answer with respect to hearsay is that such evidence does not satisfy
PMI, but his argument is not entirely persuasive because it fails to account convinc-
ingly for the many exceptions to the hearsay rule. See Mike Redmayne, The Structure of
Evidence Law, 26 OXFORDJ. LEGAL STUD. 805, 819 (2006).
297 For this reason, the Court often views with suspicion rules that exclude evi-
dence categorically on the ground of its unreliability, even though many common
rules of admissibility are similarly justified. Compare Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61
(1987) (striking down, as a violation of the Compulsory Process Clause, a state
supreme court's per se exclusion of post-hypnosis testimony on the ground that a
"State's legitimate interest in barring unreliable evidence does not extend to per se
exclusions that may be reliable in an individual case"), with id. at 64 n.* (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting) (noting that he failed to "discern any meaningful constitutional dif-
ference between [admissibility] rules and the one at issue here").
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the current system.298 The Allentown Mack decision, for instance,
could have prompted the NLRB to develop an exclusionary rule that
forbid companies from offering testimony about employee comments
made during interviews with the company at all for the purpose of
showing that it had a good faith reasonable doubt about the union's
ongoing support. The suggestion is admittedly speculative, but it indi-
cates how the use of rules of weight could present an attractive alter-
native to the all-or-nothing approach of exclusionary rules.
CONCLUSION
Of course, all of this may raise more questions than it answers. If
we were to develop a system of rules of weight, who should develop
them? What precedential effect would they have? What standard of
review ought apply to them? Answering such questions requires a
more granular analysis, and the answers may differ across adjudicatory
contexts. In this Article, my aim has been simply to suggest that such
inquiries are worthwhile, and that rules of weight ought not be cate-
gorically discarded as anachronistic or alien to the common law.
Finally, and more generally, my hope is that this Article also has
made clear that our thinking about facts may profit from our thinking
about law-and vice versa. I defined a rule of weight in part as one
whose primary purpose was to ensure evidentiary reliability, but per-
haps rules of weight may legitimately serve independent policy goals,
much as presumptions do. In the administrative context, then, might
judicial deference to agency-developed rules such as those at issue in
Allentown Mack be justified on grounds akin to those underlying the
Chevron doctrine of statutory construction? 299 Alternatively, if rules of
weight stand in tension with an evidentiary norm that demands indi-
vidualized attention to the particular facts of the case, might there be
in some contexts a comparable demand on judges when interpreting
the law? Whatever the answers to such questions, a recognition that
the law treats legal questions quite differently from factual ones ought
to begin the inquiry, not end it.
298 See supra text accompanying note 240.
299 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984).
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